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I. INTRODUCTION
The importance of confidentiality is axiomatic in mediation. 1 Or, perhaps
more accurately, the perception of confidentiality is of central importance.
The benefits of confidentiality flow from each party's expectation, during a
mediation, that neither the mediator nor the other party will be able to
disclose later what transpires. But because mediation confidentiality is not
(and should not be) absolute, the strength of this expectation depends on the
ability to predict, at least roughly, the limits on disclosure in a future dispute.
In the current legal environment, such prediction is not realistic because so
many uncontrollable factors determine which of many widely varying legal
frameworks a court will use to determine disclosure. Predictability is a
particular problem in subsequent litigation in federal court, the focus of this
article, because the federal doctrine governing choice of law for
confidentiality is peculiarly complex. In fact, uncertainty as to applicable law
extends even to confidentiality for mediations conducted under the auspices
of the federal courts themselves. 2
The need for consensus on appropriate disclosures, and the consistency it
would bring to confidentiality, is now a pressing concern because of the
extent to which mediation has come of age. Its use has increased dramatically
both in breadth and frequency. Mediation has become an integral part of
resolving disputes involving every imaginable subject in a wide range of
I See infra text accompanying notes 10-23.
2 A significant number of federal district courts established ADR programs as part of
the expense and delay plans they developed under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990,
28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994). By 1996, over half the districts offered mediation,
prompting the conclusion that "[m]ediation has emerged as the primary ADR process in
the federal district courts." ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & DONNA STIENSTRA, ADR AND
SETTLEMENT IN THE FEDERAL DIsTRIcT COURTS 4 (1996). Congress encouraged further
growth in federal court mediation programs with the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act
of 1998, 28 U.S.C. § 652 (Supp. V 1999). The Act requires every district court to
establish an ADR program by local rule. District courts must require litigants to consider
using ADR in every case and they are authorized to require them to use mediation. Id.
§ 652(a). The federal Courts of Appeals also have active mediation programs in each
circuit. See, e.g., Robert W. Rack, Pre-argument Conferences in the Sixth Circuit Court





settings: by private agreement, in collective bargaining, within the
commercial sector, through community centers, and as part of the dispute
resolution services provided by state and federal courts. 3 In the public sphere,
the federal government encourages mediation within its agencies and by its
own lawyers.4 The states have passed hundreds of statutes establishing
specific mediation programs,5 and many have now created state offices
dedicated to fostering greater reliance on mediation.
6
Unfortunately, this healthy growth in mediation has been accompanied,
perhaps inevitably, by a rise in disputes that touch on mediation. This
subsequent litigation may concern a multitude of topics, including the
underlying dispute in an unsuccessful mediation, disagreements over the
existence or validity of a settlement agreement reached in mediation, and
claims of attorney or mediator misconduct. There are really no limits on the
type of proceeding in which mediation discussions may be relevant. In many
of these post-mediation disputes a party seeks to rely on statements made, or
events that occurred, during mediation and therefore attempts to pierce the
confidentiality of the mediation in discovery, at trial, or in an administrative
proceeding. If these attempts become routinely successful, they will threaten
the important goals fostered by the promise of confidentiality in mediation.
Currently, it is not an overstatement to say that no mediator or counsel in
the country can, with confidence, predict the extent to which it will be
possible to maintain the confidentiality of a mediation. At one time mediators
routinely promised comprehensive confidentiality to participants, 7 but many
3 See generally Developments in the Law-The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARv.
L. REv. 1851, 1855-57 (2000).
4 See Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-584 (Supp.
2000) (authorizing federal agencies to use ADR techniques); Exec. Order No. 12,778, 56
Fed. Reg. 55,195 (Oct. 25, 1991) (directing federal litigation counsel to suggest ADR to
private parties and to use ADR in resolving claims against the United States). The
Federal Alternative Dispute Resolution Council recently published guidance on
confidentiality in agency ADR programs. Confidentiality in Federal Alternative Dispute
Resolution Programs, 65 Fed. Reg. 83,085 (Dec. 29, 2000).
5 See 1 SARAH R. COLE ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE, at App. C-1-1
app. C (2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 2001).
6 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-7-101 to 16-7-102 (Michie 1999); NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 25-2905 (Michie 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 179.01-179.04
(Anderson 1999 & Supp. 2000); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.105 (1999).
7 See, e.g., Kevin Gibson, Confidentiality in Mediation: A Moral Reassessment,
1992 J. DIsP. RESOL. 25, 28 (1992). See also ROBERT J. NIEMIC Er AL., GUIDE TO
JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF CASES IN ADR 93-94 (2001) ("participants in court-based
ADR are usually assured at the outset of the process that their communications will be
kept confidential"); Lawrence R. Freedman & Michael L. Prigoff, Confidentiality in
Mediation: The Need for Protection, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 37, 42 (1986) (survey
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mediators are more cautious now. Mediation confidentiality law differs
greatly among jurisdictions in many dimensions. Discrepancies in
confidentiality protection from state to state and court to court send
confusing and contradictory messages-on the extent to which parties can
reasonably expect their statements in mediation to remain confidential.
Predictability must be improved if confidentiality is to create its intended
benefits for the mediation process. Furthermore, there is a special need for
clarity in expectations when the parties are ordered to participate in
mediation by a court or when a court-sponsored program makes
representations about the confidentiality of its process. In this situation
undermining expectations of confidentiality can also mean undermining trust
in the courts.
Fortunately, much work toward clarifying party expectations for
confidentiality in mediation has been done at the state level. In a historic
cooperative venture, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) and the American Bar Association (ABA) have been
working jointly to draft a Uniform Mediation Act. 8 One of the drafters'
primary goals is to foster a consistent approach to confidentiality in
mediation.9 Thus, a mechanism is available for creating predictability for
mediation disputes in the state court system.
This Article, therefore, emphasizes predictability for mediation
confidentiality in federal court proceedings, which have not received the
same amount of attention. In terms of the overall effect on mediation parties,
the discrepancies among federal court rules and practices, the lack of vertical
harmony between federal and state law, and the underdevelopment of federal
mediation confidentiality law are as important as, and perhaps even more
problematic than, horizontal state-to-state variations in confidentiality
protections. Unfortunately, there is no single or simple solution, in part
because of difficulties inherent in parallel court systems of overlapping
jurisdiction and in part because of difficulties associated with protecting
confidentiality.
Part II of this Article provides background on the importance of
confidentiality in the mediation setting and outlines competing values that
can justify disclosure of mediation communications in subsequent litigation
proceedings. An interest analysis suggests that in many circumstances
of mediation programs revealed that "most mediation is now done under the assumption
that communications are privileged under the law, even if they really are not privileged").
8 See, e.g., Michael B. Getty et al., Preface, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 787
(1998) (Symposium on Drafting a Uniform/Model Mediation Act).




multiple jurisdictions have interests in applying their law to confidentiality
disputes, setting the stage for "true" conflicts of law that cannot easily be
resolved.
Part I explores why-the prospects for predictability are so poor when a
dispute that can be decided 'in federal court implicates mediation
confidentiality. First, it is not always easy. to predict the court system and
jurisdiction in which potential confidentiality issues will be tried, even-when
the mediation is conducted as part of a court-annexed program. Second,
state-law protective mechanisms currently create uncertainty, because they
differ greatly in their scope and coverage. Federal law mechanisms, in
contrast, create uncertainty, because they, are lagely unarticulated. Third,
vertical choice of law for confidentiality issues in federal court involves more
than the usual complexities, because the mode of analysis itself depends on
the source of protection. Courts select applicable law differently depending
on whether mediation confidentiality is determined by a, privilege, an
evidentiary exclusion, testimonial incapacity, or settlement law...
Part IV examines possible means to increase predictability'. There are a
number of potential approaches, all of which offer only partial solutions.
Parties can use .mediation -agreements to control confidentiality to a
significant extent, and this practice could be expanded. More uniform federal
court rules governing mediations could provide a coherent source for
developing common law. The states have the power to greatly improve
predictability in the overall court system by adopting the Uniform Mediation
Act. The federal rule governing privileges could be revised to reduce
uncertainty in choice of law. And a federal mediation privilege could create
consistency and bypass the slow process of common-law development. Some
combination of these initiatives will be necessary to improve the
predictability of mediation confidentiality in the federal courts.
II. CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE CONTEXT OF MEDIATIoN
Confidentiality is a controversial subject in, many contexts. But it is
regarded as so crucial for mediation that the importance of confidentiality
itself is rarely at issue in mediation scholarship. Rather, the major concern is
with its effectiveness and limits on its reach. 10 Numerous commentators have
10 The academic literature is replete with discussion of circumstances that justify
disclosure of mediation communications in order to satisfy values that compete with
confidentiality. See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 7 (arguing that it is appropriate to breach
confidentiality when necessary for accountability or to report threats, crime or abuse);
Mori Irvine, Serving Two Masters: The Moral Obligation, Under the Rules of
Professional Conduct To Report Attorney Misconduct in a Confidential Mediation, 26
RUTGERS L.J. 155, 181-83 (1994) (advocating exceptionfor mediatoi, to report attorney
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concluded that confidentiality is central to the mediation process,11 and even
most self-described dissenters agree with the principle that confidentiality
needs to be protected to some extent, although they may disagree on the
choice of protective legal mechanism.
12
misconduct); Pamela A. Kentra, Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Speak No Evil: The
Intolerable Conflict for Attorney-Mediators Between the Duty To Maintain Mediation
Confidentiality and the Duty To Report Fellow Attorney Misconduct, 1997 BYU L. REV.
715, 753-54 (1997) (proposing exception to confidentiality statutes to allow mediators to
report attorney misconduct); Alan Kirtley, The Mediation Privilege's Transformation
from Theory to Implementation: Designing a Mediation Privilege Standard To Protect
Mediation Participants, the Process and the Public Interest, 1995 J. DisP. REsOL. 1, 39-
52 (surveying statutory confidentiality exceptions); Lynne H. Rambo, Impeaching Lying
Parties with Their Statements During Negotiation: Demysticizing the Public Policy
Rationale Behind Evidence Rule 408 and the Mediation-Privilege Statutes, 75 WASH. L.
REv. 1037, 1093-96 (2000) (arguing for an exception allowing impeachment by prior
inconsistent statements made in negotiation and mediation); Perrin Rynders,
Confidentiality in Mediation: A Conflict Between Two Value Systems, 72 MICH. B.J.
1016, 1017 (1993) (pointing out that Michigan "Child Protection Law unambiguously
requires at least some mediators to disclose confidences regarding child abuse"); Brian D.
Shannon, Confidentiality in Texas Mediations: Ruminations on Some Thorny Problems,
32 TEx. TECH L. REv. 77, 79 (2000) (comparing exceptions to confidentiality in the draft
Uniform Mediation Act to outcomes under Texas law); Dennis Sharp, The Many Faces of
Mediation Confidentiality, DisP. RESOL. J., Nov. 1998, at 53, 56 (discussing state
variations in confidentiality exceptions); Jeffrey C. Sun, University Officials as
Administrators & Mediators: The Dual Role Conflict & Confidentiality Problems, 1999
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 19, 22 (1999) (discussing disclosure requirements that may trump
university policies of mediation confidentiality); Peter N. Thompson, Confidentiality,
Competency and Confusion: The Uncertain Promise of the Mediation Privilege in
Minnesota, 18 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 329, 365-69 (1997) (recommending
exceptions to mediation privilege).
11 See, e.g., Ellen E. Deason, The Quest for Uniformity in Mediation Confidentiality:
Foolish Consistency or Crucial Predictability?, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 79, 79 (2001);
Kenneth R. Feinberg, Mediation-A Preferred Method of Dispute Resolution, 16 PEPP. L.
REV. S5, S28-29 (1989); Freedman & Prigoff; supra note 7, at 37-40; Philip J. Harter,
Neither Cop Nor Collection Agent: Encouraging Administrative Settlements by Ensuring
Mediator Confidentiality, 41 ADMIN. L. REv. 315, 323-27 (1989); Kirtley, supra note 10,
at 15-19; James L. Knoll, Protecting Participants in the Mediation Process: The Role of
Privilege and Immunity, 34 TORT & INS. L. REV. 115, 115 (1998); Michael L. Prigoff,
Toward Candor or Chaos: The Case of Confidentiality in Mediation, 12 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 1, 1-3 (1988); Kent L. Brown, Comment, Confidentiality in Mediation: Status
and Implications, 1991 J. Disp. RESOL. 307, 309-11 (1991); Christopher H. Macturk,
Note, Confidentiality in Mediation: The Best Protection Has Exceptions, 19 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 411, 412 (1995); Timothy Hoxie, Note, Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation,
98 HARV. L. REV. 441,444-45 (1984).
12 See, e.g., Charles W. Ehrhardt, Confidentiality, Privilege and Rule 408: The
Protection of Mediation Proceedings in Federal Court, 60 LA. L. REv. 91 (1999)
(arguing that Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 408 provides adequate confidentiality
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One of the reasons to use mediation is that a skilled neutral can enhance
the quality and quantity of information brought to bear in a settlement
attempt. This information, in turn, can improve the chances that the parties
will reach an acceptable resolution to their dispute. In mediation, the parties
may exchange information directly with each other or indirectly, with
information relayed between them by the mediator. They may also reveal
information solely to the mediator. A skilled mediator can often use this
sensitive information to advance the negotiations even without conveying it
to the adversary party. Confidentiality is a key element in encouraging this
three-way communication process. Within the mediation process, mediators
emphasize that they will not convey statements made in confidence in a
caucus. But confidentiality must also extend outside the mediation process if
it is fully to encourage parties to disclose information within mediation.
Otherwise, many parties will be inhibited in their discussions by their
concern that the mediator or adversary party will reveal, or be compelled to
reveal, mediation statements.
13
Encouraging forthright participation in the process is analogous to the
rationale for privileges that protect confidentiality within important
relationships such as those between attorney and client, priest and penitent,
or doctor and patient. 14 Confidentiality is deemed essential in order to enable
a quality of communication that would otherwise not take place. 15 In these
familiar dyads, a privilege enhances candid communication by building on an
existing foundation of trust that is inherent in a consultation with an advisor.
protection for mediation); Eric D. Green, A Heretical View of the Mediation Privilege, 2
OHIO ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 1, 2, 32 (1986) (recognizing that confidentiality is
"important, necessary, and appropriate" in "core cases" but arguing that a privilege is
unnecessary to protect confidentiality); Note, Making Sense of Rules of Privilege Under
the Structural (II)logic of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1339, 1355-
57 (1992) (concluding mediation should be protected by FRE 408). But see Scott Hughes,
A Closer Look: The Case for a Mediation Privilege Has Not Been Made, 5 DIsP. RESOL.
MAG. Winter 1998, at 14 (urging "it is important to remember that no empirical data
exists that connects the success of mediation with the availability of a confidentiality
privilege").
13 Disclosures outside legal proceedings may be as much a concern as those in the
context of a future lawsuit. Although some rules purport to prohibit "any" disclosure, this
is a matter best left to the parties, who have more direct control over this form of
confidentiality breach through agreement than they do over potential disclosure in
litigation.
14 See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 298, at 279-82 (John W. Strong ed.,
5th ed. 1999).
15 Cf Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (stating purpose of
attorney-client privilege is "to encourage full and frank communication between
attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance
of law and administration of justice").
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Mediation, in contrast, involves adversary parties whose relationship is often
characterized at the outset by a high level of distrust. 16 Hence, confidentiality
takes on an even greater significance in encouraging effective
communication in the mediation setting.
Confidentiality protection is especially important when the parties to a
mediation are already in litigation or when litigation looms. Without such
protection, parties will rationally anticipate that their statements in mediation
will be turned against them by the opposing party if there are subsequent
legal proceedings. As stated by the Second Circuit, this means that
participants in meditation "of necessity will feel constrained to conduct
themselves in a cautious, tightlipped, non-committal manner more suitable to
poker players in a high-stakes game."' 17 When the parties' relationship is
defined by their adversarial posture in litigation, confidentiality is a tool that
can modify this tightlipped conduct by allowing parties to step back from an
adversarial form of engagement in order to better take advantage of the
possibilities of mediation.
Confidentiality is also crucial to another cornerstone of mediation: the
mediator's neutrality. It is this neutrality, along with faith in a mediator's
skill, that permits the parties to trust the process enough to use it
effectively.18 Confidentiality protections contribute to this neutrality by
limiting mediator testimony in post-mediation proceedings about the original
dispute or about other disputes arising out of the mediation. A mediator has
the most comprehensive view of a mediation, and her testimony may be
viewed as more credible than that of any disputing party. 19 As a result,
parties with a disagreement implicating a mediation usually attempt to call on
the mediator to testify about what transpired during the mediation. In the
courtroom, where one party wins and one loses, a mediator who testifies will
often serve as a tiebreaker, and her disclosures will thus be seen as
supporting one side to the detriment of the other.20 Although the mediation in
question might have ended, such disclosures raise the possibility that neutrals
in future mediations may similarly be required to testify. Because the nature
16 See, e.g., KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 160
(2d ed. 2000) (noting lack of trust as problem in dispute resolution).
17 Lake Utopia Paper Ltd. v. Connelly Containers, Inc., 608 F.2d 928, 930 (2d Cir.
1979).
18 Neutrality has been described as "a primary value of mediation." Jacqueline M.
Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle for Truly Educated
Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775, 837 (1999).
19 See, e.g., Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1136-39 (N.D. Cal.
1999) (identifying interests advanced by compelling mediator to testify).




of good faith participation in mediation creates a likelihood that a mediator
will gain knowledge that would be useful to one's adversary, if mediator
testimony became commonplace even the most circumspect neutral would be
unable to overcome the risk that his future testimony would be harmful to
one of the parties.
21
Confidentiality also serves an institutional purpose by safeguarding the
neutrality of adjudication in a court that may hear a dispute arising out of a
mediation. Evidentiary rules and court confidentiality policies for mediation
communications deter parties from trying to use these communications to
their advantage and protect the court from the perception of bias that could
accompany that use. This rationale for maintaining confidentiality is
particularly important in the context of court-sponsored mediation. Here the
institutional ties between the mediation and potential subsequent adjudication
create a possibility that a judge may receive information ex parte from a
mediator. Confidentiality rules governing the court's mediation program can
reassure the parties that informal routes to the decisionmaker are as restricted
as formal evidentiary channels. This precaution not only avoids a chill on
parties' participation in mediation, but, just as importantly, it helps maintain
the stature of the court.22
For confidentiality protections to satisfy these purposes, parties must be
confident of them before they are needed. Communication needs
encouragement and the parties need to trust the mediator's neutrality ex ante,
during the mediation before disclosure issues actually arise. Thus, conditions
conducive to mediation depend on the parties' ability to predict, or at least
approximate, the extent to which mediation communications will remain
confidential in subsequent litigation. 23
Current law is a long way from permitting parties to anticipate, even
roughly, the degree of confidentiality they can count on in mediation. An
absolute prohibition on any disclosure about mediation could fulfill this need
for predictability, but confidentiality is not an unyielding principle. It
competes with the fundamental litigation norm (itself stated in absolute
terms) that a court is entitled, to borrow from the words of Wigmore, to
21 See, e.g., Marchal v. Craig, 681 N.E.2d 1160, 1163 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (stating
that court rule preventing mediator testimony protects the mediation process itself).
2 2 See, e.g., NIEMIc ET AL., supra note 7, at 112-13.
23 See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) ("[I]f the
purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served, the attorney and client must be
able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be
protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in
widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.").
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
"every [person]'s evidence." 24 Mediation confidentiality also competes with
more specific values that can be advanced by knowledge of communications
made in mediation. 25 Disclosures may be justified, for example, by policies
that further making accurate decisions in criminal cases, preventing child
abuse or neglect, responding to allegations of attorney or mediator
misconduct, or ensuring that a settlement agreement is not enforced if it was
procured by fraud or duress.
Few, if any, jurisdictions have reached the same policy balance between
each of these reasons to permit disclosure and the benefits of maintaining
mediation confidentiality. Existing confidentiality safeguards vary
dramatically in both their legal format and their scope, reflecting
experimentation with different approaches as the field of mediation has
developed. 26 This creates potential conflicts when more than one
jurisdiction's law is relevant to the balance between confidentiality and
disclosure. Depending on the circumstances, potential sources of applicable
law for mediation confidentiality may include the forum where the
underlying cause of action is (or was) pending, the host of the mediation, the
forum for the subsequent confidentiality dispute, or the source of the
underlying cause of action at issue in the mediation or in the subsequent
dispute. One jurisdiction may perform all these functions, but they may also
be spread among jurisdictions,2 7 making both federal law and state law
(including perhaps the law of multiple states) relevant to the confidentiality
decision.
When a confidentiality dispute implicates the policies of multiple
jurisdictions, the number of potential sources of applicable law can
sometimes be reduced by asking which jurisdictions are "likely to experience
the social consequences of implementing or frustrating those policies"'28 and
removing the unaffected jurisdictions from contention on the theory that they
have no "interest" in applying their policies.29 A settlement eliminates some
24 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192, at 70 (John T. McMaughton rev.
1961); see also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (quoting United States
v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)).
25 See, e.g., Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Federalism and Federal Rule of Evidence 501:
Privilege and Vertical Choice of Law, 82 GEO. L.J. 1781, 1802-03 (1994) (stating a
privilege represents a substantive interest that prevails over the interest in admitting all
relevant evidence, but that gives way to other substantive interests that justify exceptions
to the privilege).
26 See infra Part III.B.
27 See infra Part I.A.
2 8 RussELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3.1, at 52
(4th ed. 2001).
29 Id. § 1.5, at 7-9.
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important state or federal interests that would otherwise be relevant to a
court's choice of privilege law. The goals of the substantive law at issue in a
case are always implicated when the law provides a privilege. A privilege
can prevent information that might be probative from coming to light,
making a court's decision less accurate and less effective in effectuating
those goals.30 When parties reach a settlement, however, they substitute their
own consensual resolution for the norms that would have been enforced
through the law that governs the cause of action. Unless their settlement
violates regulatory law, they are free to replace the outcome they would have
obtained in court under state or federal norms with their agreed outcome. 31
This replacement removes the state or federal interest in achieving those
norms. The parties are, in fact, choosing their own law. In an interest
analysis, this may simplify the choice-of-law decision for mediation
confidentiality to some degree. It means that there is no need to consider the
interests associated with the original underlying cause of action when a
mediation successfully led to a settlement of that action.
Even with this potential simplification through interest analysis, the
hallmark of choice of law in mediation disputes is its complexity. When an
underlying cause of action (filed in what I will call the initial forum) is at
issue in a mediation, whether that forum is federal or state, one of its likely
goals is to encourage successful settlements that will reduce the burden on its
courts. More broadly, the forum's goals probably include a fair mediation
procedure that provides parties with the means to tailor their own resolution
for their dispute. Because protection for confidentiality contributes to the
success of mediation, but at the same time may also have costs for other
values, the forum's confidentiality rules represent a chosen balance between
maintaining confidentiality and requiring disclosures.
If communications made during mediation in the initial forum are at
issue in a proceeding in a subsequent forum, the subsequent forum's
confidentiality decision will affect the ability of the initial forum to
encourage mediated settlements. Yet the subsequent forum may well make
this decision without reference to the initial forum's policy choices between
encouraging settlement and other goals. In general, if the subsequent forum
uses a mediation confidentiality rule that requires disclosure when the initial
forum's rules promised confidentiality, parties may eventually put less faith
in that promise and settlement rates may fall in the initial forum. Conversely,
goals that compete with confidentiality in the initial forum, such as the
importance of ensuring that parties are not'held to agreements obtained by
duress, can be threatened when a mediated agreement is at issue in a
30 See, e.g., Dudley, supra note 25, at 1801-03.
31 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OFLAws § 187 (1971).
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subsequent jurisdiction that does not permit disclosures in the relevant
circumstances. When the mediation is sponsored by a court or other
governmental entity, additional goals may also factor into the policy mix,
such as the reputation and integrity of the sponsoring court. Because
mediations are sponsored by federal courts, this interest is relevant to
decisions between federal and state law as well as in a horizontal choice
between state laws.
There are also mediations conducted without an underlying suit or in a
jurisdiction other than the one in which an underlying suit was filed. The
same issues that are important when a host jurisdiction serves as an initial
forum--encouraging settlements and providing a fair balance with other
goals in its law governing mediation-are important for its role as a host.
Additionally, a host jurisdiction may seek to attract mediation activity. If so,
it will have an interest in meeting the expectations of parties who choose to
mediate in the jurisdiction. Like an initial forum, a host jurisdiction may bear
the consequences of a subsequent court's action if it runs counter to the
host's policy balance.
32
The forum for a subsequent confidentiality dispute has an interest in
using its own familiar rules to decide evidentiary issues raised by the dispute
in an efficient manner. In addition, depending on the nature of that dispute,
this forum may also have an interest in applying its policy balance on
confidentiality and disclosure. If, for example, a mediation was conducted in
a divorce proceeding and the subsequent dispute concerns child abuse, the
effects of admitting or excluding statements made during the mediation about
treatment of the children will have consequences within the jurisdiction of
the subsequent proceeding.
When the subsequent dispute concerns the validity of a mediated
settlement, additional policies become relevant. The mediation host and the
forum(s) probably all have rules that set policies designed to ensure that
those who mediate or litigate in their jurisdictions receive the benefit of the
contract for which they bargained, but not of agreements reached through
unacceptable means. Moreover, in settlement disputes, the relevant policies
also extend to norms related to the underlying claim. The jurisdiction that is
the source of the settled (or allegedly settled) cause of action may have
standards for the conditions under which the right in question may be
surrendered, which would give it an interest in seeing its law applied to judge
the validity of the settlement. In a settlement of a federal Title VII claim, for
32 For example, statements made in a confidential gang mediation program in one
jurisdiction but revealed during a criminal prosecution in another jurisdiction with less




example, there is an expressed federal interest in preventing the federal rights
at issue from being surrendered in a contract obtained without knowing
consent. 33 Similarly, the relevant state would have an interest in the
conditions under which a party releases a state-created claim. Therefore the
forum, the mediation host, and the jurisdiction whose cause of action was
settled all have interests in the application of their own laws, and those laws
may differ in the extent to which they subordinate the goal of mediation
confidentiality to concerns for how parties surrender rights and reach
agreements.
In mediation, the parties also have an interest in the policy balances that
determine the confidentiality of their communications and the conditions for
enforcing their settlements. They may enter an agreement to mediate that
specifies their own confidentiality provisions, designates a choice of law, or
selects a mediation provider whose rules either cover confidentiality or
contain a standard choice of law. In such contractual relationships, courts
often recognize party autonomy and apply the choice of law indicated by the
parties, or in the absence of an indication, fall back on the law of the
jurisdiction with the most significant relationship. 34 For many privileges,
even if the parties' choice of law provides less protection for confidentiality
than the forum's law, a court could regard their decision to accept less
stringent confidentiality as a simple waiver and apply the parties' agreement.
If the parties' choice interferes with a public policy of the forum,
however, a court may limit their autonomy to choose their own
confidentiality policy. Thus, in a forum that protects the effectiveness of
mediation by safeguarding mediator neutrality, a court would be justified in
overriding the parties' choice of law if it would abrogate forum limitations
on the mediator's testimony. Additionally, under generally applicable
principles, parties cannot validly agree to limit the availability of evidence to
third parties. This public policy means that while parties can control
confidentiality among themselves through a private law agreement, they
must rely on public law to maintain confidentiality with respect to
nonparties. There is also an important role for public law in providing
confidentiality for parties who might not foresee the need, or have the means,
to enter a confidentiality agreement.
In sum, there are pragmatic reasons to prevent disclosure of mediation
communications in subsequent litigation. The effectiveness of mediation is
enhanced when parties, participants, and (especially) mediators maintain
confidentiality. As discussed in more detail in the following sections, the
extent to which jurisdictions have chosen to protect mediation confidentiality
33 See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
3 4 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
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varies greatly, as does the weight given this confidentiality in the face of
competing policies that favor disclosure. This variety is challenging in itself;
in addition, multiple choice-of-law rules exacerbate the parties' difficulty in
predicting confidentiality for their mediation.
M. THE DIFFICULTY IN PREDICTING CONFIDENTIALITY PROTECTION
Parties face multiple uncertainties concerning potential post-mediation
disputes that may affect the level of confidentiality protection their mediation
communications ultimately receive. First, section A illustrates that it may be
hard for mediation parties to predict which court will hear their
confidentiality dispute, which is the starting point for predicting choice of
law. Second, even if parties can predict they will be in federal court, or a
particular state court, they still face uncertainty in anticipating the protections
that will apply to their confidentiality dispute. There are two primary
components to this uncertainty: variable law and multiple ways to determine
choice of law. Section B sketches the great variation in the current law of
mediation confidentiality that faces a party in federal courts. Section C
explores the further challenges to predictability associated with an unusually
complex vertical choice-of-law process in federal court. These challenges are
created by a combination of myriad analyses and their varied application by
the courts. They also extend to federal court mediation programs, where it
can be unclear whether local court rules, undeveloped federal common law,
or the vagaries of state law will govern confidentiality disputes.
A. What Forum Will Determine Confidentiality?
With a private mediation before suit is filed, parties have no pre-existing
link to any particular court or court system. If the dispute is not successfully
resolved and ends up in court, the parties may lodge the case in any court
where it meets jurisdiction and venue requirements. 35 Parties who are
citizens of the same state and whose disputes do not involve federal claims
can predict that they will end up in state court, probably in their "home"
state. But any dispute that could involve a federal cause of action creates the
possibility of suit in either state or federal court. And any dispute that
35 See, e.g., Asten, Inc. v. Wangner Sys. Corp., No. C.A. 15617, 1999 WL 803965
(Del. Ch. Sept. 23, 1999) (Delaware court enforcing agreement reached in Florida
mediation to settle patent litigation in South Carolina between two Delaware corporations
with principal places of business in South Carolina). Parties to a private agreement to
mediate may control this uncertainty to some extent by designating a choice of judicial
forum in the event the mediation is unsuccessful.
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involves parties of different state citizenship opens the door to suit in either
state or federal court in multiple states.
In contrast, for a private mediation in an ongoing case, the court where
the underlying dispute is on the docket will often decide confidentiality
disputes that arise out of the mediation of the case. This would be the pattern,
for example, if the case does not settle and one party seeks to admit evidence
from the mediation as the suit progresses. Additionally, with the advent of
court-sponsored mediation programs, parties might well assume that any
confidentiality issues arising during or after the mediation would be decided
by the court under whose auspices the mediation occurred or perhaps in an
appeal from that court.
While this linkage between the forum for the initial suit and the forum
for the confidentiality dispute exists in many cases,36 it is certainly not
guaranteed; many possible forums may be available and the initial forum
may even be foreclosed. For instance, when a lawsuit is settled in mediation
and the proceeding is terminated, a later challenge to the agreement can be
brought in any court where jurisdiction and venue requirements are satisfied.
This may introduce flexibility that permits filing in a different court, but it
may also bring limitations that prevent filing in the court where the
underlying suit was pending. If the parties settle and dismiss a suit brought in
federal court under federal question jurisdiction, for example, that court may
lack jurisdiction for a subsequent enforcement action brought under state
law.37 Furthermore, whether the lawsuit was settled or not, mediation
communications may be relevant in a later suit, possibly brought in a
36 See, e.g., Pueblo of San Ildefonso v. Ridlon, 90 F.3d 423 (10th Cir. 1996)
(imposing sanctions on attorney for failure to appear at court-sponsored mediation
conference); Clark v. Stapleton Corp., 957 F.2d 745 (10th Cir. 1992) (per curium)
(discussing breach of confidentiality in Tenth Circuit mediation program); Doe v.
Nebraska, 971 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Neb. 1997) (piercing confidentiality to decide motion
for sanctions arising out of mediation in district court mediation program); Bernard v.
Galen Group, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (sanctioning attorney for violation
of confidentiality provisions of court's mediation program and referral order).
37 See, e.g., Morris v. City of Hobart, 39 F.3d 1105, 1111-12 (10th Cir. 1994)
(holding cause of action for breach of Title VII settlement agreement created by state
law, so federal court lacked jurisdiction). See generally Michael E. Solimine,
Enforcement and Interpretation of Settlements of Federal Civil Rights Actions, 19
RUTGERS L.J. 295, 306-18 (1988) (exploring possible theories of jurisdiction to enforce
settlement agreements); Darryl R. Marsch, Note, Postdismissal Enforcement of
Settlement Agreements in Federal Court and the Problem of Subject Matter Jurisdiction,
9 REV. LrIG. 249, 261-66 (1990) (discussing considerations in anticipating the need for
judicial enforcement of a settlement agreement in a dismissed federal case). If the parties
agree to do so, they may maintain jurisdiction in federal court by entering their settlement
as a judgment or a consent decree. The settlement would then become a public record
subject to disclosure. See Solimine, supra, at 302.
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different court and perhaps involving different parties. The implications of
this forum uncertainty are not merely theoretical; the cases discussed below
indicate that as litigation of confidentiality issues has increased, so have
instances where questions arising out of a mediation of a case in litigation,
including cases from court mediation programs, have been decided elsewhere
under different confidentiality provisions.
Confidentiality disputes move among courts within both the federal and
state court systems. When a mediation is court-sponsored, this means another
court may decide confidentiality issues connected to the mediation. For
example, confidentiality questions from appellate mediations often need to
be decided by trial courts. A motion to enforce a settlement agreement
allegedly reached in appellate mediation typically requires a trial court to
hold a hearing. 38 Federal mediated class-action settlements need district court
examination and approval. 39 In addition, after a mediated settlement
terminates a case, the confidentiality of that mediation may later become an
issue in a suit brought in another forum within the same court system.
40
Even more significant from the perspective of ensuring mediation
confidentiality, disclosure issues also cross the line between the state and
federal court systems. The federal courts have been a venue for
confidentiality disputes arising out of state, and state court, mediation
programs. 41 Conversely, mediations held during federal court proceedings
38 See, e.g., Martin v. Automobili Lamborghini Exclusive, Inc., No. 98-6621 (S.D.
Fla. June 12, 2000) (applying state law in denying motion to enforce settlement
agreement purportedly reached during mediation on interlocutory appeal to the Eleventh
Circuit); Lyons v. Booker, 982 P.2d 1142 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (remanding for
consideration of motion to enforce alleged mediated settlement).
39 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (requiring court approval for dismissal or compromise of
class action). This approval generally involves a "fairness hearing" on the settlement.
See, e.g., Bailey v. Great Lakes Canning, Inc., 908 F.2d 38, 42 (6th Cir. 1990) (per
curium) ("The district court may not approve a [class action] settlement unless it
determines after hearings that the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable, as well as
consistent with the public interest."). Other settlements may also require hearings and
court approval under state law. See, e.g., Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260, 1265 (1 lth Cir.
2001) (holding that Alabama law required district court to hold a hearing to determine the
fairness of settlement before it would bind minor party).
40 See, e.g., Datapoint Corp. v. Picturetel Corp., No. Civ.A. 3:93-CV-2381D, 1998
WL 25536 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 1998) (deciding challenge to settlement reached in a
related case in the Southern District of Texas mediation program).
41 See, e.g., In re March, 1994-Special Grand Jury, 897 F. Supp. 1170 (S.D. Ind.
1995) (refusing to recognize state court mediation privilege as federal common law or to
quash federal grand jury subpoena of mediator's testimony about mediation held under
auspices of state court); Smith v. Smith, 154 F.R.D. 661 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (quashing
subpoena to mediator to testify regarding claim that plaintiff was fraudulently induced to
sign settlement reached in state court mediation program), affid, No. 3:92-CV-0170-D,
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may end up in dispute before state courts.42 This is especially likely when a
federal court lacks jurisdiction over a mediated settlement agreement.
43
This flexibility of potential forums means that predictability for
confidentiality is a joint federal and state problem. For many mediations,
confidentiality issues could be raised in the courts of either system. In the
federal courts, the great variability in state confidentiality provisions is a
major contributing factor to the lack of predictability because federal courts
apply state confidentiality rules in many instances. Federal law also fosters
unpredictability, because the common law process has operated slowly and
few jurisdictions have articulated principles for mediation confidentiality.
Moreover, the relevant federal statutes and rules contemplate inconsistent
approaches to the development of confidentiality for mediation. The next
section considers the extreme variability of the confidentiality protections
provided by current state and federal law and the problems associated with
them.
B. What Protection Will State or Federal Law Provide?
When state law will govern the confidentiality of a mediation, parties
face uncertainty in predicting the level of protection primarily because of the
huge variation in state provisions. These variations occur in the types of
mediations given statutory protection, the nature and scope of that protection,
and the exceptions that permit disclosures despite confidentiality protection.
There is a fundamental discrepancy among the states: about half of them
have not enacted a comprehensive statute or rules to govern confidentiality in
mediation. The modem trend in the states is to adopt mediation statutes or
evidentiary rules of general application to govern mediations without
limitation to the subject matter of the dispute or the setting of the
1996 WL 768061 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 1996); United States v. Gullo, 672 F. Supp. 99
(W.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding federal criminal defendant's statements made in state
sponsored mediation privileged); Hudgins v. Sec. Bank of Whitesboro, 188 B.R. 938
(Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1995) (determining validity of settlement agreement from state court
mediation).
4 2 See, e.g., Republican Co. v. Albano, No. 99-312 (Hampden Co. Mass. Sup. Ct.
Apr. 2, 1999) (deciding claim for access to confidential agreement reached in federal
Court of Appeals mediation program).
43 See, e.g., Allen v. Leal, 27 F. Supp. 2d 945, 949-50 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (finding no
supplemental jurisdiction for counterclaim on breach of mediation settlement agreement
allegedly coerced by mediator; remanding to state court). In a settled case, however,
parties may be able to retain the jurisdiction of the federal court that entered the dismissal
by entering the agreement as a judgment or a consent decree. See generally Solimine,
supra note 37, at 301-02; Marsch, supra note 37, at 256-66.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
mediation.44 In contrast, older state statutes often establish a particular
mediation program and thus confer confidentiality protections that are
limited to mediations within a specific context.45 In jurisdictions without a
general mediation statute, the operative limits on disclosure of a mediation
communication will depend on whether or not the mediation is covered by
one of these specialized statutes. 46 This creates at least two classes of
mediations: those with special state protection for confidentiality and those
without. In jurisdictions with multiple statutes for separate mediation
44 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238 (West 1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-
7-206 (Michie 1999); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1115-1128 (West Supp. 2001); IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 679C.1-679C.5 (West Supp. 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-452a (Supp. 2000);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4112 (West Supp. 2001); ME. R. EVID. § 408; MASS. GEN.
LAWS. ch. 233, § 23C (2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(la) (West 2000); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 435.014 (West 1992 & Supp. 2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-813 (1999); NEB.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-2901 to 25-2921 (Michie 1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48.109
(Michie 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-9 (West 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-04-11
(1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.023 (Anderson 1998); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§§ 1801-1813 (West 1993 & Supp. 2001); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 36.100-36.245 (1999); 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5949 (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-44 (1997); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13-32 (LEXIS Supp. 2001); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§§ 154.001-154.073 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2001); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.21 to
8.01-581.23 (LEXIS 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.070 (West 1995); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 904.085 (West 2000); WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-43-101 to 1-43-104 (LEXIS 2001).
45 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 45-19-36(e) (1998) (fair employment); 775 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7B-102(E) (West 1996 & Supp. 2001) (human fights); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 654A.13 (West 1995 & Supp. 2001) (farmer-creditor disputes); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 216.15B (West 2000) (civil rights); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 3345(10) (West
Supp. 2000) (natural gas pipeline disputes); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-168 (Michie
1998) (workers' compensation); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38.3 (1999) (agricultural
nuisance disputes); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 § 4555 (LEXIS Supp. 2001) (human rights);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.11(11) (West 1993) (Wisconsin Supreme Court Order 93-03
repealed subsection (11)) (family court). Many states have separate statutes or court rules
to govern court-sponsored mediation of ADR programs. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13-22-301 to 13-22-313 (West 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.102 (West Supp.
2001); N.H. SuP. Ct. R. 170 (2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38.1 (1999); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 78-31b-2 to 78-31b-9 (1996 & Supp. 2001); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-576.4 to
8.01-576.12 (LEXIS 2000). Overall, there are hundreds of statutes governing specific
mediation programs. See COLE ET AL., supra note 5, app. A; Kentra, supra note 10, app.
at 757.
46 For example, in states with a court-sponsored program that lack a general
mediation statute, confidentiality protection may depend on whether or not the dispute
was filed in court prior to convening the mediation. See, e.g., Vernon v. Acton, 732
N.E.2d. 805, 808 n.5 (Ind. 2000) (reaffirming that Indiana ADR Rules apply only to civil
and domestic relations litigation filed in Indiana courts; the confidentiality provisions do
not govern private mediation held by agreement of the parties prior to litigation).
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programs, the resulting patchwork of statutory coverage is a major factor
contributing to the variety in confidentiality protection for mediation.
For some confidentiality disputes, that patchwork may include a
relatively narrow state evidentiary exclusion that ipplies to settlement offers.
Thirty-eight states have adopted, without substantial variation, Rule 408 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence (ERE).47 This rule excludes evidence of
compromisepffers on disputed claims when that evidence is submitted to
prove liability or the amount of damages. 48 Depending on the circumstances
of the disclosure, it may provide partial protection for mediation
communications. Some of the states that lack a general mediation statute
have made their version of FRE 408 explicitly applicable to mediation.49 In
other states without a general statute, this provision serves as a default rule
for all mediations that are not covered by special confidentiality legislation
for a specific mediation program. Commentators have cautioned, however,
that the rule does not cover all mediation communications and that the scope
of its protection is limited in important ways.50
But even mediations governed by a single comprehensive state statute
are subject to significant differences in protection. These statutes, enacted
over several decades of experimentation with mediation in the states, are
characterized by their variation. First, there is no agreement on a definition of
mediation to delineate their coverage. Some statutes omit any definition
47 Ehrhardt, supra note 12, at 102 n.38 (1999) (citing 6 JACK B. WEINSTEIN &
MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's FEDERAL EVIDENCE T-1 (Joseph M. McLaughlin
ed., 2d ed. 1998) (Table of State and Military Adaptations of Federal Rules of
Evidence)).
4 8 In relevant part, FRE 408 provides:
RULE 408. COMPROMISE AND OFFERS TO COMPROMISE.
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting
or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or
attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or
amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its
amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is
likewise not admissible .... This rule does not require exclusion when the
evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a
witness, negating a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a
criminal investigation or prosecution.
49 See, e.g., HAW. R. EvID. 408; VT. R. EvD. 408. Professor Ehrhardt argues that
these rules apply to mediation even in the absence of this specification. See Ehrhardt,
supra note 12, at 103-04 ("No specific statute or court-rule is necessary for Rule 408 to
be applicable in mediation proceedings, regardless of whether the mediation is voluntary
or court-ordered. Mediations involve statements made during attempts to settle or
compromise a claim."). But see infra note 126 and accompanying text.
50 See infra text accompanying notes 124-127.
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whatsoever.51 Among those that do include them, definitions can differ
substantially.52 Second, the states selected their protection for mediation
confidentiality from a smorgasbord of legal frameworks. They may employ a
privilege, testimonial incapacity, a broad evidentiary exclusion, and/or a
limited settlement negotiation exclusion. Each of these legal mechanisms has
a different scope and applicability. Third, even among states that use the
same legal framework, there can be significant differences in the degree of
confidentiality protection due to variations in coverage and exceptions.
Federal law does not offer much greater predictability. Parties seeking to
invoke a federal mediation privilege have met with mixed success, and
development of federal common law for mediation has just begun. The
general federal evidentiary provisions governing testimonial capacity and
evidentiary exclusions do not offer significant protection for mediation.
There are, in addition, some federal statutory pr6tections designed especially
for mediation, but they are not comprehensive. Following the pattern of the
early state statutes, federal enactments govern mediation confidentiality for
mediation programs only in defined settings. The most notable to date apply
to administrative agency mediations 53 and mediation programs in federal
courts.
54
This section explores the sources of variation among state confidentiality
protections and between state and federal provisions. 55 It is this variability in
protection for confidentiality, when coupled with the chaos of the choice-of-
51 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-7-206 (Michie 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-452
(Supp. 2000); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:4112 (West Supp. 2001); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 48.109 (Michie 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-9 (West 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 31-04-11 (1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13-32 (LEXIS Supp. 2001).
52 Compare MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 23C (2000) (defining mediation to require
a written agreement with a mediator who has thirty hours of training, four years of
experience, or is accountable to a mediation agency appointed by a court or agency or
that has existed for three years), with IOWA CODE ANN. § 679C.1 (West Supp. 2001)
(defining mediation as a "process in which an impartial person facilitates the resolution
of a dispute by promoting voluntary agreement of the parties," commencing at the time of
initial contact and terminating when a resolution is reached or the mediation process
concludes). See generally Erin L. Kuester, Confidentiality in Mediation: A Trail of
Broken Promises, 16 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 573, 579-80 (1995) (discussing wide
variations in scope and coverage of state mediation statutes).
53 Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, 5 U.S.C. § 574 (2000).
54 Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. § 652 (Supp. V 1999).
55 Other sources on the variability of state-law confidentiality provisions include
Kirtley, supra note 10, and the Reporter's Notes to the Uniform Mediation Act. Ehrhardt,
supra note 12, describes the variability in federal court local rules on mediation
confidentiality. For a discussion of variability in mediation confidentiality in criminal
proceedings, see Deason, supra note 11, at 109-10.
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law rules discussed in section C, that fuels uncertainty and threatens the
sense of predictability so important for fostering mediation.
1. Mediation Privilege
Many of the states with general mediation statutes or evidentiary rules
chose privilege as the most effective framework for protecting confidentiality
in legal proceedings, and this form of protection was recently selected for the
Uniform Mediation Act.56 Generally speaking, a privilege is an evidentiary
construct that allows its holder to refuse to disclose, (and to block others from
disclosing) a communication in discovery or as evidence, unless the holder
has waived the privilege or the communication fits into an exception to the
privilege.57 The provision for waiving a privilege gives flexibility to parties
who do not want to maintain the confidentiality of their mediation
communications. It also can accommodate mediation parties such as
governmental bodies subject to sunshine laws that grant public access to their
mediation communications. 
One source of variation among state privilege statutes "are discrepancies
in the designation of the holder(s), which is more difficult in mediation than
with privileges that protect confidential relationships with a trusted advisor.
Mediation involves a complex flow of communications between adversarial
parties, and it is distinguished, by the participation of the mediator as a
facilitator for those communications. Some sensitive exchanges may be made
directly from one party to another. Other discussions are held between a
party and the mediator in a caucus. The mediator in turn talks with both
parties and may, or may not, relay information between them. These multiple
paths of communication have led to ambiguity and lack of conformity in the
designation of the holders of the privilege.58 Many statutory, mediation
privileges fail entirely to designate who holds and who may Waive the
56 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238 (West 1994); IowA CODE ANN.
§§ 679C.2-679C.3 (West Supp. 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-452a (Supp. 2000); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4112 (West Supp. 2001); ME. R. EvID. § 408; OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 2317.023 (Anderson 1998); OKLA. -STAT.- ANN. tit. 12, § 1805 (1993); OR. REV.
STAT. § 36.223 (1999); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5949 (West 2000); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 19-13-32 (LEXIS Supp. 2000); TEX, CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 154.053(c) (Vernon Supp. 2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.22 (LEXIS 2000); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 5.60.070 (West 1995); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-43-103 (LEXIS 2001);
UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 4 (2001), available at http://www.pon.harvard.edulguests/umaL.
57 MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 298.
58 See Joshua P. Rosenberg, Keeping the Lid on Confidentiality: Mediation Privilege
and Conflict of Laws, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 157, 159-60 (1994).
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privilege.59 Among those statutes that do specify a holder, some designate
the parties to the mediation as the holders;60 others make the mediator either
an independent holder61 or a joint holder with the parties.
62
The designation of a holder is important for connecting a mediation
privilege to the rationales for protecting confidentiality. When the mediation
parties hold the privilege, they can use it to protect their interests in
confidentiality with a level of control over use of their communications that
will encourage them to participate fully in the mediation. Because the
parties' interests conflict in part, this assurance must include the ability to
prevent later disclosure by the other participant(s). In contrast, a privilege
that makes a mediator an independent holder as to her own communications
protects the institution of mediation. It gives a mediator the tools to maintain
59 The omission of a designation for the holder characterizes both general mediation
provisions, see, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233 § 23C (2000); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 5949 (West 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1805 (West 1993); TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 154.073 (Vernon Supp. 2001); and statutes governing special
applications of mediation, see, e.g., 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 20/6 (West 1999)
(community dispute resolution centers); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-7.5-1-13 (West 1995)
(university employee unions); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 336.153 (Michie 1995) (labor
disputes); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1026 (West 1988 & Supp. 2001); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 150, § 10A (1999) (labor disputes).
6 0 See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238(B)(1) (West 1994); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 11-2-204 (LEXIS 1996 & Supp. 1999) (labor disputes); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.102(3)
(West Supp. 2001) (court-ordered mediation); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.183 (West 1997)
(divorce); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-606 (1995) (repealed 2000) (domestic disputes); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 41A-7 (1999) (fair housing); TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 154.053(c) (Vernon 2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.22(i) (LEXIS 2000); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.070(1)(a) (West 1995). See also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-43-103(b)
(LEXIS 2001) (providing parties hold privilege that mediator may claim on their behalf).
61 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 679C.3 (West Supp. 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
452a(a) (Supp. 1999); LA REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4112(E) (West Supp. 2001); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2317.023(C)(1), (2) (Anderson 1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.222(3) (1999);
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.073(b) (Vernon Supp. 2001); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 5.60.070(1) (West 1995).
62 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-307(2) (West 2000) (court-annexed
dispute resolution) (joint holders); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31b-8 (1996 & Supp. 2001)
(court ADR program) (joint holders); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1122 (West Supp. 2001)
(making the mediator an additional holder in some respects); Olam v. Cong. Mortgage
Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1129 n.23 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (discussing application of CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1122).
The Uniform Mediation Act provides privileges for both disputants' and mediators'
communications. The parties to a mediation hold both privileges jointly and each can
assert it to block testimony on any mediation communication. The mediator has an
independent privilege to block testimony on the mediator's own communications, as do
nonparty participants in the mediation. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 4(b) (2001).
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neutrality and to protect against parties' fears that she will reveal their
confidences if called to testify. A dual privilege protects both confidentiality
goals.6
3
Exceptions to mediation privileges, which accommodate competing
needs for access to mediation communications, also vary dramatically. Each
exception represents a legislative decision that in certain circumstances the
benefits of mediation confidentiality are outweighed by the benefits of
disclosing the information. These judgments often involve close policy calls,
with the result that both the form of exceptions and their content vary greatly
among the jurisdictions.64
Some states have made an overall policy decision to subordinate
mediation confidentiality to all statutory disclosure requirements, such as
open meetings acts or reporting requirements.65 Alternatively, in some states
exceptions take the form of separate legislative policy decisions for particular
disclosures. These confidentiality exceptions are typically contained in an
exclusive list of the circumstances in which the legislature has determined
that public policy warrants disclosure of mediation communications.66 Yet
another approach assigns the task of reconciling competing policies to the
courts through balancing on a case-by-case basis.67 Some jurisdictions have
selected more than one of these approaches depending on the type of
disclosure at issue.
The substantive content of exceptions that permit disclosure is equally
variable. A frequent, but not ubiquitous, statutory exception to mediation
63 See, e.g., Kirtley, supra note 10, at 30-35.
64 One especially variable exception to mediation privileges concerns the treatment
of mediated settlements. This topic is considered separately infra text accompanying
notes 141-55.
65 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238(B)(3) (West 1994); COLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 13-22-306 (West 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 679C.2(3), 679.3(2) (West
Supp. 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-452a(b)(4) (Supp. 2000).
6 6 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 679C.2-679C.3 (West Supp. 2001); OR REV. STAT.
§ 36.220-36.222 (1999); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-43-103(c) (LEXIS 2001).
67 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4112(D) (West Supp. 2001) (to resolve
conflicts with other legal disclosure requirements); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:4112(B)(1)(c) (West Supp. 2001) (for judicial determination of the meaning or
enforceability of an agreement resulting from mediation); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2317.023(C)(4) (Anderson 1998) (permitting disclosure to prevent manifest injustice on
determination, after a hearing, that necessity for disclosure outweighs importance of
protecting confidentiality in mediation); Tx. CIV. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 154.073(e) (Vernon Supp. 2001) (providing procedure relative to disclosure when
mediation confidentiality conflicts with other legal requirements for disclosure of
communications).
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confidentiality is provided for evidence of child abuse or neglect. 68
Furthermore, even in states without this mediation exception, mediators often
hold professional credentials that require them to report child or elder abuse
or neglect to state authorities under other statutes. These reporting
obligations may create conflicting obligations for mediators or override
mediation confidentiality protections.
69
Professional misconduct raises other competing obligations that have
prompted some states to include an exception to their mediation
confidentiality statute.70 It is also a subject that has motivated courts to create
ad hoc exceptions to mediation privileges in particular circumstances. 71 In
states without this exception, lawyer mediators and counsel for a party may
be subject to conflicting obligations if required by professional standards to
report unprofessional conduct that occurs during mediation, such as a
violation of ethical rules by a participating attorney.
72
68 See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-805(B) (West 2000); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 679C.2(5) (West Supp. 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-452a(b)(2) (Supp. 2000); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 595.02(4)(a) (West 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38.1 (1) (1999); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 328-C:9(EII)(c) (1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.052(C)
(Anderson Supp. 2000); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.220(5) (1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-
130(b)(5) (1996); UTAH CODE ANN § 78-31b-8(6) (1996 & Supp. 2001); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 63.1-248.3(A)(10) (LEXIS Supp. 2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-43-103(c)(iii) (LEXIS
2001). But see MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-437(5)) (2001) (attorney-client and mediation
privileges apply in child abuse proceeding).
69 See, e.g., 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4 (West Supp. 2000) (requiring
disclosures of child abuse even when it is revealed in a privileged communication); TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.073(e) (Vernon Supp. 2001) (stating that
confidentiality of mediation communications does not affect the duty to report abuse or
neglect under the state Family Code or Human Resources Code).
70 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4112(B)(1)(b) (West Supp. 2001) (permitting
testimony limited to issue of noncompliance in connection with motion for sanctions);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(la)(2), (3) (West 2000) (permitting mediator testimony for
statements or conduct that constitute professional misconduct or could give rise to
disqualification proceedings for an attorney); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38.1 (1) (1999)
(permitting mediator testimony for sanction proceedings).
71 See, e.g., In re Young, 253 F.3d 926, 927 (7th Cir. 2001) ("Although [appellate
mediations] are of course confidential for most purposes, their contents may be revealed
insofar as necessary for the decision of an issue of alleged misconduct in them."); Pueblo
of San Ildenfonso v. Ridlon, 90 F.3d 423, 424 n.1 (10th Cir. 1996); In re Waller, 573
A.2d 780, 785 n.5 (D.C. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that confidentiality requirement not
intended to preclude mediator from reporting possible violation of disciplinary rules to
judge); Lawson v. Brown's Day Care Ctr., Inc., No. 98-447, 2001 WL 468510 (Vt. Apr.
16, 2001) (disapproving disclosure of mediation communications in report of attorney
misconduct but holding sanctionable only with finding of bad faith).
72 See generally Kentra, supra note 10, at 717-18.
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Mediation may also precipitate a claim of misconduct on the part of the
mediator. Although mediator qualifications have been established by statute
or court rules in a majority of states,73 a party needs some mechanism to
object to a mediator's inappropriate conduct. Moreover, when mediation is
required or provided by a court, there is a special obligation to ensure
competent mediators. Several state statutes waive confidentiality when a
party brings a legal action against a mediator to permit the party to present
evidence and the mediator to defend against the claim. 74 Courts in states
without this statutory exception have also permitted testimony under these
conditions. 75
In sum, state mediation privilege statutes vary greatly in both their
structure and their substantive exceptions that permit disclosures. This
statutory variation gives significance to choice-of-law questions, and hence
creates uncertainty about coverage, even among states that have chosen a
privilege as the means to protect mediation confidentiality. Court-created
exceptions contribute an additional degree of uncertainty. While case-by-case
balancing is built into some privilege statutes, courts also have made
73 See, e.g., STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION,
MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 159 (3d ed. 1999). Several states have also
established procedures to certify mediators in some contexts. See 1 COLE ET AL., supra
note 5, § 11:04.
74 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238(B)(2) (West 1994); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 679C.2(6) (West Supp. 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-452a(b)(1) (Supp. 2000); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 595.02(la) (West 2000); OR. REv. STAT. § 36.222(5) (1999); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 5.60.070(1)(g) (West 1995); see also COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-
306(2)(d) (West 2000) (exception limited to action alleging willful or wanton misconduct
of mediator or mediation organization); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.102 (4) (West Supp. 2001)
(exception for disciplinary proceedings against mediator in court-ordered mediation);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1805(F) (West 1993) (privilege waived as to party bringing
action); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.22(ii) (LEXIS 2000) (exception for action for
damages arising out of mediation).
Florida attempts to minimize the damage to the parties' interest in confidentiality by
requiring that confidential communications revealed in mediator's disciplinary
proceeding must be redacted before the file can be made public. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 44.102(4) (West Supp. 2001).
75 See, e.g., Allen v. Leal, 27 F. Supp. 2d 945, 947 n.4 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (releasing
mediator and plaintiff from confidentiality requirement when plaintiff sought to repudiate
mediated agreement claiming coercion by mediator); McKinlay v. McKinlay, 648 So. 2d
806, 810 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (permitting mediator to testify in spite of privilege
after party claimed settlement resulted from mediator's intimidation); Evans v. State, 603
So. 2d 15, 15 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (allegation of mediator bias after judge mediated
case).
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exceptions without guidance from statutory standards, only increasing the
range of uncertainty in predicting confidentiality protections.
76
There is no equivalent under federal law to a general state confidentiality
statute. There are, however, analogies to state statutes that govern particular
mediation programs. These include the Administrative Dispute Resolution
Act, which contains confidentiality provisions for agency mediation
programs,77 and the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, which
requires federal district courts to protect confidentiality in their ADR
programs by local rule.78 Federal common law is also relevant to mediation
confidentiality, as a small number of courts have adopted a mediation
privilege and others may consider one in the future.
The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act does not label its
confidentiality provision as a privilege, but it functions more like a privilege
than any other identifiable legal category of confidentiality protection. The
Act prohibits ADR neutrals and parties from voluntarily disclosing
communications or from being required to disclose communications through
discovery or compulsory processes. 79 Like a privilege, it permits waivers and
delineates exceptions for communications that may be made public. The Act
also grants courts flexibility to create exceptions for disclosure, which are
permitted when necessary to "prevent a manifest injustice; help establish a
violation of law; or prevent harm to the public health or safety .... 80 One
significant difference from any state-law privilege, however, is that
communications made by a party during a joint session are not protected by
the Act's confidentiality provision.81 Thus, its coverage is more limited than
state law in a state with a mediation privilege.
The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, in contrast, does not itself
prescribe the terms for confidentiality. It requires each federal district court
to adopt a local rule to "provide for the confidentiality of the alternative
dispute resolution process and to prohibit disclosure of confidential dispute
resolution communications." 82 Several courts have held that this requirement
76 See infra note 151.
77 5 U.S.C. § 574 (2000).
78 28 U.S.C. § 652(d) (Supp. V 1999).
79 5 U.S.C. § 574 (a), (b).
80 5 U.S.C. § 574 (a)(4), (b)(5). But see In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Dec. 17,
1996, 148 F.3d 487, 492 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding, without considering this exception, that
Act did not create a privilege from disclosure in grand jury proceedings for
communications made in state agricultural loan mediation program).
81 5 U.S.C. § 574(b)(7).
82 28 U.S.C. § 652(d). The Act does not define confidentiality or the scope of
protection Congress intended for confidentiality. NIEMIC ET AL., supra note 7, at 94.
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does not itself create a mediation privilege. 83 Instead, in the words of one
court, it "provide[s] only a general mandate to establish the confidentiality of
court-ordered mediation proceedings. '84 Under this interpretation, absent a
privilege, "information exchanged in confidential mediation, like any other
information, is subject to the liberal discovery rules of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure . -"85 There is, however, some disagreement about the
necessity of using the precise label of "privilege" in order to make statutory
promises of mediation confidentiality effective in a legal proceeding. One
court has concluded that any rule that meets the criteria for the Act's required
confidentiality provision could be enforced in the, same way that the holder
of a privilege is entitled to refuse to produce relevant evidence and to prevent
others from disclosing protected communications. 86 In any event, unlike the
Act, some of the local rules it requires do use the language of privilege in
establishing confidentiality requirements for their mediation programs. 87 As
discussed below, however, the force of these provisions is uncertain. 88
83 See, e.g., FDIC v. White, 76 F. Supp. 2d 736, 738 (N.D. Tex. 1999); Folb v.
Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1176 (C.D. Cal.
1998), affd mem., 216 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000). See also Datapoint Corp. v. Picturetel
Corp., No. Civ.A.3:93-CV-2381D, 1998 WL 25536, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 1998)
(finding no privilege in federal court local rule that makes mediations confidential and
protects them from disclosure).
84 Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1176. This conclusion is consistent with decisions from
outside the mediation arena which have distinguished between a promise of
confidentiality and a privilege, holding that only the latter has evidentiary force. See, e.g.,
Pearson v. Miller, 211 F.3d 57, 68 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding confidentiality protections for
juveniles' files do not necessarily create a privilege); EEOC. v. Illinois Dept. of
Employment Sec., 995 F.2d 106, 109 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding confidentiality provision
for unemployment compensation proceedings does not create privilege); ACLU of Miss.
v. Finch, 638 F.2d 1336, 1342-45 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding state statute sealing records
did not create privilege in civil rights suit); Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194,
1204-05 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding immigration files confidential but not privileged from
discovery). See generally 2 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK,
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 171 (2d ed. 1994) (distinguishing duty of confidentiality from
privilege).
85 Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at'1171.
86 Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1120 n.15 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
See also infra text accompanying notes 99-94 for a description of cases quashing
subpoenas for testimony by mediators for the Community Relations Service, whose
statutory authorization specifies that its activities "shall be conducted in confidence and
without publicity." 42 U.S.C. § 2000g-2(b) (1994). Cf. State ex rel. Schneider v. Kreiner,
699 N.E.2d 83, 86 (Ohio 1998) (enforcing mediation statute that calls for confidentiality
and nondisclosure as if it established a privilege, even though the statute does not use that
term).
87 See, e.g., M.D. FLA. R. 9.07(b); S.D. FLA. GEN. R. 16.2.G.2; N.D. ILL. GEN. R.
5.10(C); E.D. WASH. LOCAL R. 16.2(d)(3); S.D. W. VA. Civ. R. 5.10(f). See also D.C.
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In the realm of federal common law, rules for mediation confidentiality
are sparse.89 As described below, only a few courts have considered whether
to recognize a common-law privilege for mediation communications and,
therefore, this issue is likely to be one of first impression with all the
uncertainty that entails. Moreover, even among federal courts that do
recognize a mediation privilege, its contours will remain uncertain for some
time as consensus on a privilege emerges slowly in response to the
circumstances of each case.
Although it did not use the term "privilege," the first court to articulate a
federal common law principle to protect the mediation process from the
damage by mediator testimony did so in the labor context. In NLRB v. Joseph
Macaluso, Inc., a company and union that were participating in a hearing
before the NLRB on a charge of unfair labor practices against the company
had contradictory versions of their mediated negotiations and disagreed on
whether or not they had reached a contract agreement.90 As is typical in such
situations, testimony by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
(FMCS) mediator would have proved dispositive in resolving the parties'
conflicting versions of how their mediation concluded. The NLRB initially
issued a subpoena to the mediator but revoked it in response to a motion
from the FMCS. The Ninth Circuit upheld the revocation, reasoning that
requiring the mediator to testify would destroy the impartiality of the FMCS
that is necessary for effective mediation. This would in turn undermine the
Cir. Order Establishing Appellate Mediation Program (Apr. 14, 1998). Other districts use
language that functionally creates a privilege although they do not identify it as a such.
See, e.g., N.D.N.Y. R. 83.11-5(4) ("Mediation is regarded as a settlement procedure and
is confidential and private. No participant may disclose, without consent of the other
parties, any confidential information acquired during mediation."); D. MAss. R. 16.4(f)
("Mediation proceedings shall be regarded as settlement proceedings and any
communication related to the subject matter of the dispute made during the mediation...
shall be a confidential communication. No admission.... or other confidential
communication made in setting up or conducting the proceedings not otherwise
discoverable or obtainable shall be admissible as evidence or subject to discovery."). For
a listing of additional districts with mediation privileges, see Ehrhardt, supra note 12, at
99 n.33.
88 See infra text accompanying notes 285-88.
89 See Wilson v. Attaway, 757 F.2d 1227, 1244-45 (1lth Cir. 1985); NLRB v.
Joseph Macaluso, Inc., 618 F.2d 51, 56 (9th Cir. 1980); Sheldone v. Pennsylvania
Turnpike Comm'n, 104 F. Supp. 2d 511 (W.D. Pa. 2000); Folb v. Motion Picture Indus.
Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D. Cal. 1998), affid mem., 216 F.3d
1082 (9th Cir. 2000); People v. Reyes, 816 F. Supp. 619, 623 (E.D. Cal. 1992); United
States v. Gullo, 672 F. Supp. 99, 104 (W.D.N.Y. 1987).
90 NLRB v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc., 618 F.2d 51, 52-53 (9th Cir. 1980).
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system of labor mediation that is essential to maintain industrial peace.91
Although the court did not identify this principle as a privilege, its analysis
and result are consistent with a privilege held by the mediator.
Outside the labor context, the same concern for the effectiveness of
mediation has also served as the rationale for quashing mediator subpoenas
in order to protect another mediation program established by federal
statute-the Community Relations Service (CRS). 92 In cases where parties
sought the testimony of CRS mediators, courts reasoned that "[t]he
effectiveness of the CRS is... dependent upon the actual and perceived
impartiality of its mediators. '93 They concluded in each case that the public
interest in maintaining that impartiality outweighed the party's need for the
testimony and refused to order disclosure.
94
Federal courts have also recognized a federal common law mediation
privilege that reaches beyond mediator testimony. In United States v. Gullo,
a mediation privilege found in the New York statute establishing community
mediation centers was relevant to the case, and the court adopted it as a
matter of federal law.95 The effect was to suppress evidence of a criminal
defendant's statements made during a mediation held at one of these centers
on issues referred by the police department concerning events that eventually
led to his indictment. Because the federal privilege adopted in Gullo was
motivated by a state mediation program and the protections adopted by the
state for that program, it provides a model for harmonizing state and federal
law in the elaboration of a federal privilege.
The fullest statement of a federal privilege, distinct from any particular
state privilege, was articulated in Folb v. Motion Picture Industry Pension &
Health Plans.96 The court was faced with a discovery request concerning a
mediation from a litigant who had not participated in the mediation. The
court drew on the reasoning of Macaluso and concluded that the reasons for
91 Id. at 55-56.
92 The function of the CRS program is to help communities resolve disputes relating
to discriminatory practices. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000g-1 (1994).
93 Reyes, 816 F. Supp. at 623 (quoting decision quashing subpoena for information
on electoral mediation effort issued in conjunction with City of Port Arthur v. United
States, 517 F. Supp. 987, 1002-03 & n.105 (D.D.C. 1981),judgment aff'd, 459 U.S. 159
(1982)).
94 Attaway, 757 F.2d at 1244-45 (quashing subpoena for mediator's testimony on
claim of unconstitutional arrest and treatment arising out of civil rights protest); Reyes,
816 F. Supp. at 623 (quashing criminal defendant's subpoena for testimony of mediator
in school dispute).
95 United States v. Gullo, 672 F. Supp. 99, 103-04 (W.D.N.Y. 1987).
96 Folb v. Motion Picture Indus., Pension & Health Plan, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D.
Cal. 1998), aff'd mem., 216 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000).
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protecting the impartiality of the mediator in Macaluso apply with equal
force to protecting the confidentiality of mediation proceedings. Both serve
the "same ultimate purpose: encouraging parties to attend mediation and
communicate openly and honestly in order to facilitate successful alternative
dispute resolution. ' 97 Therefore, the court created and partially defined such
a privilege.
The court declined to outline the full contours of a mediation privilege,
noting that it was not considering questions such as waiver or exceptions. 98
The circumstances of the case did, however, raise the need to define
"mediation" for purposes of the privilege because while some of the
statements at issue took place in sessions with the mediator, the final
settlement was reached later in discussions directly between the parties. The
court delineated a privilege that protects communications between the parties
and communications with the neutral only in preparation for, or during, a
formal mediation session.99 In order to avoid stepping onto what it saw as
turf controlled by FRE 408, the court categorically excluded from coverage
by the privilege all settlement negotiations between the parties subsequent to
the formal mediation session. Under the Folb court's mediation privilege,
therefore, communications are not protected after the session with the
mediator even if these subsequent discussions are direct follow-ups that
involve information initially disclosed during the mediation. The only way to
protect these communications is to return to a formal mediation session with
a neutral. 100 This scope of protection is inconsistent with every current form
of state protection for mediation confidentiality.
In Sheldone v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, another court
recognized a federal mediation privilege, drawing its contours from its local
court mediation rule. 101 This privilege protects from disclosure "'all written
and oral communications made in connection with or during' a mediation
conducted before a 'neutral' mediator." The protected communications may
not be "used for any purpose" in the court action "or in any other
proceedings," and no one is bound by anything said or done in the mediation
except by a written settlement agreement or written stipulations., 02 The
coverage for communications "in connection with" a mediation is potentially
97 id. at 1172.
98 Id. at 1180 n.10.
99 Id. at 1180.
100 Id. at 1180.
101 Sheldone v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 104 F. Supp. 2d 511, 517 (W.D.
Pa. 2000).
102 Id. at 517 (quoting W.D. PA. L. R. 16.3.5(E)).
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broader than that of the Folb privilege, in that it might include
communications following the close of a mediation session.
Other federal courts have emphasized the restraint they are instructed to
apply when considering a common law privilege, consistent with the
Supreme Court's instruction that privileges "must be strictly construed and
accepted 'only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or
excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally
predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining
truth."' 103 Without a clear mandate from Congress, several have declined
invitations to recognize a federal common law mediation privilege in the
context of criminal investigations.
1°4
In sum, while mediation privileges are probably the most common form
of confidentiality protection, their widespread adoption in the states is
characterized by extensive variation in scope and coverage. They are less
well established in federal law, either by statute or as a matter of federal
common law, and often differ in key ways from state mediation privileges.
There is thus much potential conflict between federal and state privilege rules
for mediation.
2. Restriction on Mediator Testimony
Evidence provided by a mediator has the potential to upset the parties'
expectations of confidentiality that encourage their participation and to
undermine the mediation process more generally by casting doubt on
mediator neutrality. Many states target these threats by restricting mediator
testimony. Some statutes attempt to prevent all mediator testimony by
formally declaring that mediators lack capacity or are incompetent to testify
about mediations they have facilitated.105 Others offer a more limited form of
confidentiality protection with provisions that, immunize mediators from
service of process or subpoena. This prevents mediators .from being
compelled to testify but leaves them competent to do so voluntarily.
10 6
10 3 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (quoting Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
104 See generally In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated December 17, 1996, 148 F.3d
487, 493 (5th Cir. 1998); In re March 1994-Special Grand Jury, 897 F. Supp. 1170,
1173 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
105 See, e.g., CALEVID. CODE § 703.5 (West 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(la)
(West 2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-9(c) (West 2000).
106 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238(C) (West 1994); ARK. CODE ANN.
§16-7-206(b) (Michie 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-452a(a) (Supp. 2000); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:4112(b)(2) (West Supp. 2001); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 435.014(1) (West
1992 & Supp. 2001); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. 48.109(3) (Michie 1996); OKLA. STAT.
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Rules of testimonial incapacity and immunity from process serve a
function in this context by sending a strong signal that it is important to
prevent mediator testimony from undermining mediation confidentiality. 107
Nonetheless, by itself, testimonial incapacity is an incomplete measure for
ensuring confidentiality in mediation. First, even in states that make
mediators incompetent to testify, courts have treated this provision as subject
to exception and have taken evidence from the mediator concerning what
transpired during a mediation.108 Second, while these measures insulate the
mediator from the inconvenience of testifying and prevent harm to the
mediation process that would stem from such testimony, they typically offer
no protection from evidence offered by a party to the mediation.109 Thus, a
state restriction on mediator testimony is nlost effective as an additional
provision bolstering the protections provided by at least one other form of
confidentiality provision.10
ANN. tit. 12, § 1805(C) (West 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-44 (1997); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 904.085(3)(b) (West 2000). Some courts have adopted similar provisions. See, e.g.,
IND. ADR R. 2.11, IND. CODE tit. 34 app. Court Rules (Civil) (mediators not subject to
process).
107 See Marchal v. Craig, 681 N.E.2d 1160 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that parties
to mediation may not waive court rule that mediator is not subject to service of process
because rule protects the mediation process itself). But see Kenny v. Emge, 972 S.W.2d
616, 621 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (holding trial court erred in requiring mediator to testify
but error did not prejudice plaintiff because mediator's testimony duplicated defendant's
account that the parties had reached an agreement).
108 See, e.g., Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1138 (N.D. Cal.
1999).
109 There are, however, some states that also protect the parties from judicial
process, although this provides no guarantee that they will not testify about the mediation
voluntarily. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:4112(b)(1) (West Supp. 2001); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1805(C) (West 1993).
110 See infra text accompanying note 132. In addition to these practical limitations,
this legal form of protection for confidentiality has a shaky theoretical foundation, at least
in its pure form of testimonial incapacity or incompetence. Competency rules typically
emphasize characteristics of witnesses that are necessary for them to testify (such as
personal knowledge), or that disqualify them (such as an interest that may make the
testimony unreliable). Rules of testimonial incapacity are usually generalizations about
witness biases that are deemed serious enough to exclude all testimony by such witnesses
as unreliable. See generally 27 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6002, at 18 (1990). In mediation, nothing inherent
in the mediator's role brings her ability to testify reliably into question; in fact, the
mediator's testimony is sought precisely because it may be the only source of reliable,
unbiased information. As a result, statutes disqualifying mediators from testifying do not
rest entirely easily within the rubric of traditional testimonial incapacity.
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In contrast with the variation found in state competency law, the general
federal rule is that every person is competent to be a witness.111 There are,
however, some federal equivalents of state provisions that limit service of
process or subpoena power for mediation testimony. The Administrative
Dispute Resolution Act contains this form of protection," 2 as do some
federal court rules for court-annexed mediation programs. 113
3. Evidentiary Exclusion
A significant number of states have chosen to protect confidentiality with
an evidentiary exclusion that makes all evidence of mediation
communications inadmissible at trial.114 The general purpose of this
evidentiary mechanism is to prevent court actions from discouraging a
socially desirable activity. When states exclude evidence of subsequent
remedial steps following an injury, for example, their theory is that if this
evidence were admissible to show that problems existed prior to the injury, it
would create a disincentive for defendants to correct those problems. The
legislature has considered the deleterious effects of this disincentive in
contrast to the probative value of this type of evidence and decided as a
matter of public policy to limit the evidence despite the potential harm to the
accuracy of the adjudication. 115 By extension, in the case of mediation, an
evidentiary exclusion reflects the judgment that avoiding harm to
confidentiality, and consequently to the mediation process, is more valuable
than evidence of mediation communications.
111 FED. R. EVID. 601. See infra note 194. There are, however, exceptions that
disqualify judges and jurors from testifying. See FED. R. EVID. 605; FED. R. EVmD. 606.
112 5 U.S.C. § 574(a)-574(b) (2000).
113 See, e.g., D.C. Cir. Order Establishing Appellate Mediation Program (Apr. 14,
1998) ("Mediators shall not comply with requests for information about mediated cases
and if subpoenaed, are hereby instructed not to testify."); N.D. ALA. ADR Plan IV.B.10.
(mediator "disqualified as witness . .. in any pending or future action relating to the
dispute"); E.D. Mo. L.R. 16-6.04 ("neutral shall not testify regarding matters disclosed
during ADR proceedings").
114See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §16-7-206(a) (Michie 1999); CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1119 (West Supp. 2001); Mo. ANN. STAT. 435.014 (West 1992 & Supp. 2001); NEB.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-2914 (Michie 1995); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48.109 (Michie
1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13-32 (LEXIS Supp. 2001); TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 154.073(a) (Vernon Supp. 2001);WIS. STAT. ANN. § 904.085(3)(a) (West
2000).
115 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 84; § 127, at 26. Other categories of
evidence often excluded include liability insurance coverage, juvenile delinquency
records, and the payment of medical expenses by a third party (the collateral source
doctrine).
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At first glance, a categorical exclusion of evidence seems clear,
straightforward, and very protective of confidentiality. In its pure form, an
exclusion is hard for courts or parties to avoid or modify. All evidence of a
particular type is simply banned, and there is no holder who can waive that
ban, as can the holder of a privilege. But in practice, many state mediation
exclusions are not pure. Most contain exceptions that permit certain
disclosures 116 and some include waiver opportunities." 17 Moreover, courts
have resisted an absolute approach to confidentiality for mediation
communications. They have found waivers and created exceptions to
exclusionary rules that reflect other values. 118 These decisions mean that
evidentiary exclusions may actually offer less security for mediation
confidentiality than appears on the face of the statute. They also lessen the
predictability of evidentiary exclusions as a means to ensure
confidentiality.119
Through FRE 408, federal law also provides an evidentiary exclusion,
not specifically for mediation, but for settlement offers in general.
120
116 For example, Wisconsin makes an exception to its mediation exclusion for
evidence of child abuse. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 904.085(4)(d) (West 2000). Nebraska's and
South .Dakota's evidentiary exclusions do not apply in suits by mediation parties who
claim mediator misconduct. NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-2914 (Michie 1995); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13-32 (LEXIS Supp. 2001). There are also exceptions that permit
disclosure when communications concern crime or fraud. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 16-7-206 (Michie 1999); NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-2914 (Michie 1995); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13-32 (LEXIS Supp. 2001). In addition to specifying exceptions,
Wisconsin's exclusion also allows courts to create exceptions when necessary to prevent
manifest injustice. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 904.085(4)(e) (West 2000).
117 See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1122 (West Supp. 2001) (permitting disclosure
when all mediation participants and mediator expressly agree in writing).
118 When faced with a comprehensive evidentiary exclusion, a court in a civil
juvenile delinquency proceeding permitted evidence of statements made during
mediation in order to preserve the juvenile's constitutional right to confrontation. Rinaker
v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. Rptr. 464, 466 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). See also Doe v. Nebraska,
971 F. Supp. 1305, 1307-08 (D. Neb. 1997) (interpreting rules to permit evidence of
mediation settlement proposals in sanction proceeding regarding failure to authorize
representative); Guevara v. Sahoo, No. 05-00-01086-CV, 2001 WL 700517, at *2 (Tex.
Ct. App. June 22, 2001) (granting motion for sanctions against attorney based on
testimony regarding note delivered in mediation).
119 But see Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n. v. Bramalea California, Inc., 25 P.3d
1117, 1119 (Cal. 2001) (overruling court-created exception to confidentiality and holding
that statute barred submission and consideration of mediator's report and mediation
communications in connection with a motion for sanctions for failure to participate in
good faith in mediation).
120 See supra note 48.
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FRE 408 is referenced in a number of federal courts' mediation rules 121 and,
as discussed above, state equivalents may govern mediations under some
state law. 122 When states have a specific provision that protects
confidentiality in a particular mediation, they treat it as if it displaces
FRE 408 entirely for negotiations connected with that mediation. In contrast,
one federal court adopted a federal common law privilege to operate in
tandem with FRE 408. It created a privilege with a limited temporal scope
that applied only to communications made in preparation for and during
formal mediation sessions, leaving FRE 408 to govern subsequent
negotiations held without the mediator's participation. 123
FRE 408 and its state enactments are, however, far less protective than
the state mediation evidentiary exclusions just discussed. 124 First, by their
own terms, they apply only in proceedings subject to state or federal rules of
evidence. Consequently, they offer no protection for mediation
communications at issue in discovery, most arbitrations, and many
administrative proceedings. Second, the protection is also limited in scope:
settlement discussions are excluded from evidence only when they are
offered to prove or disprove liability or the amount of damages. This leaves
many opportunities for admitting evidence of mediation communications,
such as when the purpose is to impeach a witness or provide evidence of
motive. 125 Third, not all communications in mediation are necessarily
covered within the rubric of settling or compromising a claim. Parties in
mediation frequently discuss topics that are germane to their relationship as a
whole, but may not be related directly to the specific claims raised in the
lawsuit they are trying to settle. Under a strict reading of the rule,
communications on these ancillary topics are not excluded from evidence,
because they are not disputed. 126 As a result of these shortcomings,
121 See, e.g., 3d CiR. L. APP. R. 33.5(c); E.D. TENN. L. R. 16.4(h). In contrast, other
federal court rules use language similar to that of broader state evidentiary exclusions.
See, e.g., 6th CIR. R. 33(c)(4) ("statements and comments ... shall not be disclosed ...
by counsel in briefs or argument").
122 See supra text accompanying note 49.
123 See supra text accompanying notes 96-100.
124 See generally Jane Michaels, Rule 408: A Litigation Minefield, LITIG., Fall 1992,
at 34 (discussing the limitations and ambiguities of FRE 408).
125 See also In re Bidwell, 21 P.3d 161, 163 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (holding Oregon
Evidence Code 408 did not bar admission of mediation communications offered in
support of request of attorney's fees).
126 COLE ET AL., supra note 5, § 9:05 ("courts have ruled statements outside
[FRE 408's] scope if sufficiently unrelated to settlement").
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numerous commentators have criticized the protection FRE 408 provides for
mediation confidentiality.
27
A few states have added to the variety in evidentiary exclusions by
strengthening their versions of FRE 408 to increase their protection of
mediation confidentiality. Maine, for example, has expanded the coverage of
its version of FRE 408 so that conduct or statements by a party or mediator in
a court-sponsored marital mediation are not admissible for any purpose.
128
This enhancement essentially converts Maine's rule into a comprehensive
evidentiary exclusion, similar to those discussed above, for domestic
relations mediations. In Indiana, the supreme court interpreted the state's
version of FRE 408 to permit the introduction of mediation agreements as
evidence only when they are written and signed, thereby strengthening the
rule to withstand threats to confidentiality posed by allegations of oral
settlements.'
29
In sum, for mediations governed only by FRE 408, there may be no
distinction between confidentiality protection in state and federal court.
When a federal court recognizes a mediation privilege, however, federal law
is then more protective than the state-law default equivalents of FRE 408.
Conversely, in states with an evidentiary exclusion or a strengthened state
version of FRE 408, there is a potential conflict in a federal court that relies
only on the relatively weak protection of FRE 408.
4. Multiple and Uncertain Legal Frameworks
A number of jurisdictions rely on more than one of these frameworks to
protect mediation confidentiality. First, in states that lack a general mediation
statute, confidentiality provisions for specific types of mediations coexist
with Rule 408's default provision. This creates a patchwork of coverage by
statutes that can vary in the protection they offer. 130 The inconsistency is
confusing, and the protection offered by these statutes may be ambiguous.
131
127 See, e.g., id. §§ 9:05-9:07; Wayne D. Brazil, Protecting the Confidentiality of
Settlement Negotiations, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 955, 957-82 (1988); Feinberg, supra note 11,
at S33-35; Freedman & Prighoff, supra note 7, at 40; Harter, supra note 11, at 348-56;
Kirtley, supra note 10, at 12-14; Brown, supra note 11, at 313-314; Hoxie, supra note
11, at 449-50, 457-59; Kuester, supra note 52, at 582-84. There are, however,
commentators who contend that FRE 408 provides adequate protection for mediation
confidentiality. See, e.g., Ehrhardt, supra note 12, at 102-110, 119-126.
128 ME. R. EVID. 408(b).
129 Vernon v. Acton, 732 N.E.2d. 805, 810 (Ind. 2000).
130 See supra text accompanying notes 45-50.
131 For example, the emphasis in many court-annexed mediation programs is on
preventing disclosures to the court. This can lead to mediation rules that cannot be
[Vol. 17:2 2002]
PREDICTABLE MEDIATION CONFIDENTIALITY
Second, in some states ambiguity stems from the use of multiple legal
frameworks within a single general mediation confidentiality statute. One of
the most frequent patterns is a combination of either a privilege or
evidentiary exclusion with a provision that prohibits mediator testimony,
132
but other combinations are more complex. 133 Furthenore, even states that
purport to rely explicitly on one legal construct Often contain statutory
language that is more consigtent with another form of protection, 134 leading
to ambiguity in the operation of the statute: When the confusion created by
combining multiple protections for confidentiality is compounded by
inadequate identification of the legal mechanisms, the reader is left to deduce
the classification from the function of the provision's.
135
The redundancy in state statutes suggests not only" that some legislatures
regard protection for mediation confidentiality as important and. would like to
make it ironclad, but also that they are not confident that any one legal form
identified as any of the possible legal rubrics for protecting the parties' expectations of
confidentiality or the mediator's need to maintain confidentiality. See, e.g., UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-31b-8(4) (Supp. 2001) (mediation participants and the neutral in court
programs may not disclose and may not be required to disclose mediation
communications).
132 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.. § 12-2238 (West 1994); ARK. CODE ANN. §16-
7-206 (Michie 1999); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 703.5, 1119-1124, 1152 (West 2001); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-452a (Supp. 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4112 (West Supp. 2001);
MNN. STAT. REV. R. 408; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 435.014 (West 1992 & Supp. 2001); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. 48.109 (Michie 1996); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 904.085 (West 2000).
133 The Texas alternative dispute resolution statute, for example, contains what
appears to be a privilege held by the parties, an evidentiary exclusion, and immunity from
service of process. The provision that functions as a privilege is'in the subdivision on the
neutral's duties: all matters are confidential and not to be disclosed (presumably by the
neutral) unless the parties agree otherwise. TEX. Civ. pRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 154.053(c) (Vernon Supp. 2001). Additionally, a separate section on the confidentiality
of mediation records and communications reads like an evidentiary exclusion, declaring
that a communication made by a participant in an ADR procedure "is confidential, is not
subject to disclosure, and may not be used as evidence against the participant in any
judicial or administrative proceeding." Id. § 154.073(a). Finally, the statute also adds
immunity from service of process for testimony that would disclose this confidential
ADR information. Id. § 154.073(b).
134 See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 10, at 335-37 (arguing that MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 595.02(1)(1) (West 2000) establishes a mediation privilege even through it is framed in
terms of competency).
135 See, e.g., Haghighi v. Russian-Am. Broad. Co., 945 F. Supp.' 1233, 1235 (D.
Minn. 1996) (stating "it is unclear whether the [Minnesota] statute creates a privilege or a
rule of competency") rev'd on other grds, 173 F.3d 1086 (8th Cir. 1999); Daniel R.
Conrad, Confidentiality Protection in Mediation: Methods and Potential Problems in
North Dakota, 74 N.D. L. REv. 45, 56 (1998) (stating it is not clear if N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 31-04-11 (1996) creates a rule of privilege or of inadmissibility).
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can be trusted to provide sufficient protection. Mediation confidentiality may
not, however, be a situation where more protection is necessarily better
protection. State statutes that do not identify a clear legal framework for
mediation confidentiality create a risk that a court will not recognize a
familiar construct with known boundaries.
As courts are increasingly called upon to apply state confidentiality
provisions, ambiguities in the form of legal protection are likely to lead to
increasing mutability of the legal framework. For example, in Olam v.
Congress Mortgage Co., a federal magistrate judge characterized
California's confidentiality provision as a privilege. 136 Although this
provision appears in the state evidence code as an evidentiary exclusion, the
statute also contains a mechanism for waiver, which gives it some features of
a privilege despite its label. 137 The court interpreted this "privilege" to permit
court-made exceptions and fashioned one for claims of duress. 138 By giving
judges ambiguous or multiple legal frameworks, lawmakers have increased
courts' flexibility and also the uncertainty as to which construct courts will
apply.
Moreover, as explored below, in federal court lack of statutory clarity is
significant for another reason: the mode of analysis a court uses to determine
the applicable confidentiality law in federal court depends on which of the
legal frameworks described above provides that confidentiality. 139 This
situation is analogous to the process of characterization in choice of law.
Jurisdictions typically have different choice-of-law rules depending on
whether a suit involves tort, or contract, or property. A court must first
describe the doctrinal foundation of a case, and the applicable choice-of-law
analysis then flows from this doctrinal characterization. This process has
permitted courts to escape rigid rules in settings where more than one
characterization is possible. 140 Similarly with confidentiality, a court must
first identify the protection at issue as a privilege, evidentiary exclusion, or
another type of protection. This label then determines the method for making
136 Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
137 Section 1119 of the California Rules of Evidence makes written or oral
communications during mediation inadmissible. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1119 (West Supp.
2001). In addition, however, section 1122, entitled "Communications or writings;
conditions to admissibility" permits disclosure when all participants and the neutral
arbitrators agree in writing. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1122 (West Supp. 2001). This section
thus seems to function as a waiver provision with all the parties and the mediator holding
the equivalent of a privilege.
138 Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1131-32.
139 See infra Part III.C.
140 See generally WEINTRAUB, supra note 28, § 3.2.
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the choice between federal and state law, but a court may be able to exercise
flexibility in applying the label.
5. Enforcing Mediated Settlements
Perhaps the most frequent confidentiality issues arise during attempts to
enforce mediated settlement agreements.' 41 First, the danger of disclosure is
inherent in disputes about whether the parties reached an oral agreement. As
stated in the commentary to the draft Uniform Mediation Act,
[t]he disadvantage of exempting oral settlements [from confidentiality
protection through a mediation privilege] is that nearly everything said
during a mediation session could bear on either whether the parties came to
an agreement or the content of the agreement. In other words, an exception
[to confidentiality] for oral agreements has the potential to swallow the rule
of privilege. 142
Second, settlement enforcement proceedings raise confidentiality problems
when a court is asked to evaluate a claimed contract defense of duress or
fraud that would make an agreement unenforceable. These are delicate
situations, for precluding this evaluation could undermine the principle of
agreement by party consent in mediation.143 Yet examining a mediation to
establish the legitimacy of an agreement in effect negates any prior promise
of confidentiality.
State practices differ greatly. Some enforce oral settlements as a matter
of general contract law; others have an equivalent to the statute of frauds that
requires a writing for settlement agreements. 44 With regard specifically to
settlements reached in mediation, state, statutes exhibit a full range of
variability. A large number establish protections for mediation
141 This subject is treated more thoroughly in Ellen E. Deason, Enforcing Mediated
Settlement Agreements: Contract Law Collides With Confidentiality, 35 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 33 (2001).
142 UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 6(a)(1) reporter's notes (2001).
143 For discussions of the importance of party consent in mediation, see Nolan-
Haley, supra note 18; Joseph B. Stulberg, Fairness and Mediation, 13 -OIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 909, 944 (1998) (fairness in mediation requires "the most robust possible
conception of party choice and autonomy").
144 In several states, court rules impose a writing requirement for agreed stipulations
filed in court, including agreements to dismiss a settled suit, unless the agreement is made
in open court or entered as an order. See, e.g., ALASKA R. Civ. PRO. 8 1(e); ARIZ. R. Civ.
PROC. 80(d); MICH. CT. RULE 2.507(H); NEv. R. DIST. CT. 16; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 2104
(McKinney 1997); S.C. R. Civ. PROC. 43(k); TEX. R. CIV. PRO. 11; WASH. CIVIL RULE
2A.
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communications but are silent on issues concerning settlements. 145 Thus,
they appear to reject a confidentiality exception for enforcing or invalidating
agreements, but it may be that they have simply overlooked this issue. Others
impose a writing requirement for settlement agreements, either linked to an
evidentiary restriction such as a privilege 146 or stated as a flat directive.
147
Some limit disclosures to claims that an agreement was obtained by fraud or
duress.148 Others permit disclosures in any proceeding to enforce a
settlement. 149 Yet others rely on judicial exceptions made on a case-by-case
basis. 150 And whether or not permitted by the applicable statute, courts have
made, and will likely continue to make, case-by-case exceptions to
145 See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238 (West 1994); ARK. CODE ANN. §16-
7-206 (Michie 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-452a (Supp. 2000); ME. R. EVID. §408;
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 23C (2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(la) (West 2000);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 435.014 (West 1992 & Supp. 2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48.109
(Michie 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-9 (West 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 1805 (West 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-44 (1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13-32
(LEXIS Supp. 2001); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 154.053(c), 154.073
(Vernon Supp. 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 lb-8 (1996 & Supp. 2001).
146 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.102(3) (West Supp. 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-38.1(1) (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.023 (Anderson 1998); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5949(b)(1), (c) (West 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.070(1)(e)
(West 1995); UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 6(a)(1) (2001). See also Vernon v. Acton, 732
N.E.2d 805, 810 (Ind. 2000) (interpreting evidentiary exclusion of settlement negotiations
to include evidence of oral agreements).
147 See, e.g., FLA. R. CIV. PRO. 1.730; IND. CT. ADR R. 2.7(E)(2); MNi'. STAT.
ANN. § 572.35 (West 2000); N.C. SUPER. CT. MEDIATED SETrLEMENT CONF. R. 4(C);
N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 849-b(4)(d) (McKinney 1992); UTAH ADR CT. R. 101(e).
148 See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5949(b)(3) (West 2000) (limited exception
to privilege for evidence of fraudulent mediation communications applies only in
proceedings to set aside written agreement on the ground of fraud).
149 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 36.222(4) (1999) (establishing exception to
mediation privilege for proceedings "to enforce, modify or set aside a mediation
agreement"); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-43-103 (c)(v) (LEXIS 2001) (no privilege if "one of
the parties seeks judicial enforcement of mediation agreement"). Oregon does recognize
the threat this exception poses for confidentiality, however, and attempts to mitigate the
effects by providing that a court may seal the record when mediation communications are
disclosed in proceeding to enforce mediation agreement. OR. REV. STAT. § 36.222(4).
150 Louisiana, for example, authorizes judges to admit testimony on what transpired
during the mediation in order to interpret or enforce an agreement only if the evidence is
"necessary to prevent fraud or manifest injustice." See LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:4112(B)(1)(c) (West Supp. 2001). Ohio and Wisconsin allow courts to make
exceptions to avoid "manifest injustice" that could apply in the context of settlement
enforcement. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.023(C)(4) (Anderson 1998); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 904.085(4)(e) (West 2000) (exception limited to proceedings other than the
dispute that was mediated).
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confidentiality to preserve contract defenses that would be unavailable if the
confidentiality of mediation communications were strictly maintained. 151
Federal law on enforcing settlements is very thin, but there is some law
associated with settlements of suits brought under federal statutes, especially
concerning civil rights and employment, 152 as well as when federal law
dominates the landscape.153 This settlement law did not develop in the
context of mediation and tends to be less protective of confidentiality than
many state laws designed for mediation. In the Title VII context, for
example, courts have established requirements for knowing consent in
executing a waiver,154 but they routinely enforce oral settlement agreements
151 See, e.g., Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999)
(making exception to state statutory grant of confidentiality for party's claim that
settlement was obtained by duress); Allen v. Leal, 27 F. Supp. 2d 945, 947 (S.D. Tex.
1998) (releasing parties and mediator from confidentiality obligations to evaluate validity
of settlement agreement when party alleged mediator coercion); Smith v. Smith, 154
F.R.D. 661, 664 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (considering mediation disclosure on claim of fraud);
Randle v. Mid-Gulf, Inc., No. 14-95-01292, 1996 WL 447954, at *2 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug.
8, 1996) (remanding for hearing on duress allegation). For a discussion of the need for
individualized balancing in such cases, see Deason, supra note 11, at 113; Deason supra
note 141, at 88-91.
152 See, e.g., Maynard v. Durham & S. Ry. Co., 365 U.S. 160, 161 (1961) (federal
law governs validity of releases under Federal Employers' Liability Act); Morais v. Cent.
Beverage Corp. Union Employees' Supplemental Ret. Plan, 167 F.3d 709, 711-12 (1st
Cir. 1999) (holding federal common law applies to interpretation of settlement agreement
releasing ERISA-based claims; state law preempted by ERISA in context of interpreting
employee benefit plans); Fulgence v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 662 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th
Cir. 1981) (federal law governs validity of settlement of Title VII actions); Hisel v.
Upchurch, 797 F. Supp. 1509, 1518 (D. Ariz. 1992) (applying federal law to validity of
release of § 1983 claims); DiMartino v. City of Hartford, 636 F. Supp. 1241, 1249 (D.
Conn. 1986) (evaluating validity of settlement under Age Discrimination in Employment
Act using federal common law).
153 See, e.g., Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 734 (1961) (noting
"established rule of ancient respectability that oral contracts are generally regarded as
valid by maritime law" and refusing to apply New York statute of frauds); Mid-S.
Towing Co. v. Har-Win, Inc., 733 F.2d 386, 389 (5th Cir. 1984) (applying federal law to
determine validity of settlement agreement of general maritime claims); Thompson v.
Cont'l EMSCO Co., 629 F. Supp. 1160, 1163 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (holding federal law
governs validity and enforceability of settlement agreement of causes of action raised
under general maritime law).
154 The importance of a knowing waiver of employment discrimination remedies
has led courts to look beyond the plain language of a release in circumstances where the
employee was not represented by counsel, Coventry v. U.S. Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514,
524 (3d Cir. 1988); had a limited education, see Runyon v. Nat'l Cash Register Corp.,
787 F.2d 1039, 1044 (6th Cir. 1986); or had executed a standard release prepared by the
employer, Cox v. Allied Chem. Corp., 538 F.2d 1094, 1098 (5th Cir. 1976).
279
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without regard to issues of confidentiality that arise in proving those
agreements in court. 155
In sum, in terms of protections for mediation confidentiality, state law
varies along almost any dimension one could choose. Some states lack
general mediation statutes entirely; those that have them differ in the legal
form used to protect mediation confidentiality, the scope and reach of the
statute, and the extent of recognized exceptions. The federal law of mediation
confidentiality as expressed in court rules is variable. Otherwise it is largely
in an uncertain and nascent condition. Because of this extreme variation, it is
obviously important to predict which law may govern a confidentiality
dispute arising out of a mediation. The following section explores the
problems for predictability raised by the choice-of-law process in federal
court.
C. What Law of Confidentiality Will a Federal Court Apply?
Mediation confidentiality would make an ideal poster child for the
shortcomings of choice-of-law. Problems arise from many sources: the
variability in protection for mediation confidentiality, the variability in
choice-of-law analyses for mediation confidentiality, and the multiple
interests at stake in selecting a role for mediation confidentiality in a
particular dispute. Protection for mediation communications in federal court
depends on vertical choice-of-law decisions between federal and state law,
but the dizzying array of confidentiality protections under state law make
horizontal choice of law significant as well. Some states' laws may be more
protective than federal law, while others' laws may be less protective.
Moreover, this comparison is confounded by the uncertainty of the
undeveloped federal confidentiality doctrine. Thus, under current conditions,
parties need to anticipate fairly accurately whether a federal court will rely
on state or federal law for their dispute and, if state law, which state's law.
The process by which a federal court determines whether state or federal
law governs mediation confidentiality is more complex than the usual
vertical choice-of-law prediction, because the analysis is itself affected by the
type of legal protection at issue. When confidentiality is protected by a
privilege or testimonial incapacity, a federal court determines the applicable
law using the Federal Rules of Evidence: FRE 501 or FRE 601, respectively.
In contrast, if the protection is an evidentiary exclusion, then the Erie
doctrine provides the choice-of-law analysis. Whatever the form of
protection, when the threat to confidentiality arises from the need to validate
155 See, e.g., Taylor v. Gordon Flesch Co., 793 F.2d 858, 862 (7th Cir. 1986);
Fulgence, 662 F.2d at 1209; Wise v. Riley, 106 F. Supp. 2d 35, 39 (D.D.C. 2000).
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or invalidate a settlement in an enforcement ,proceeding, courts may look to
the law governing the settlement. Finally, when one of these approaches
indicates state law this may introduce additional uncertainties of horizontal
choice of law. Both the multiplicity of analytical techniques and the
uncertainties of their judicial application contribute to the lack of
confidentiality predictability in federal courts.
These multiple choice-of-law analyses each emphasize selected interests
in the choice of applicable law, but most are formulaic and do not provide a
vehicle for considering the full suite of relevant interests. Nonetheless, their
outcomes depend on a large number of unpredictable variables that
compound the underlying uncertainty resulting from the vast variations in
confidentiality protections. As a consequence, if a dispute has the potential to
end up in federal court, under current law it can be virtually impossible for
mediation participants to anticipate the extent to which their mediation
communications will be protected in the event of further litigation.
1. Mediation Privilege
The application of privileges in federal court is governed by FRE 501,156
which has been described as a rule that "raises more questions than it
provides answers. '157 Part of the problem is that parties and courts do not
always ask,, let alone answer, those questions. It is not unusual for a court
faced with privilege issues in mediation simply to assume the applicable law
or announce it without adequate analysis. 158 Moreover, attempts to answer
the questions FRE 501 raises have fulfilled the Senate Judiciary Committee's
156 The rule provides,
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, state, or political
subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they
may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings with respect to an element of
a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege
of a witness, person, government, state, or political subdivision thereof shall be
determined in accordance with State law.
FED. R. EvID. 501.
157 In re Combustion, Inc., 161 F.R.D. 51, 53 (W.D. La. 1995), aff'd, 161 F.R.D. 54
(W.D. La. 1995).
158 See, e.g., McEnany v. W. Del. County Cmty. Sch. Dist., 844 F. Supp. 523, 528-
30 (N.D. Iowa 1994) (citing federal cases in deciding if settlement agreement was
reached in mediation without discussion of applicable law); Hudgins v. Sec. Bank of
Whitesboro, 188 B.R. 938, 942-44 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1995) (using state law to evaluate
mediation settlement agreement without discussion of applicable law).
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prediction that the rule would be "pregnant with litigious mischief."159 The
structure of the rule and the intricacies of applying it mean that parties to a
mediation are likely to have difficulty predicting the extent to which a
privilege will protect their confidentiality. Most of the relevant procedural
scenarios-diversity cases, federal cases with pendent claims, and settlement
agreement issues---can be illustrated with recent federal decisions on choice
of law for mediation confidentiality issues.
There are some relatively simple cases for applying a mediation privilege
in federal court: the most straightforward is a simple diversity case with no
federal claims when the state-law issue is subject to a mediation privilege
under applicable state law. In this situation, the so-called "state law proviso"
in FRE 501 gives the federal courts explicit, directions to use the state
privilege: "in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a
claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the
privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law."'160 For example, in
Haghighi v. Russian-American Broadcasting Co. 16 1 the underlying claim was
a state law breach of contract action brought in federal court under diversity
jurisdiction. 162 The court held, under the state law proviso of FRE 501, that
the state mediation statute provided the applicable privilege for the
confidentiality dispute following the mediation of that claim. 163
In contrast, in evaluating the enforceability of a settlement agreement in
another case involving only state-law claims, the court in FDIC v. White
looked to the federal law of privilege to determine the admissibility of
statements made in mediation. 164 This court also stated it was relying on
FRE 501 but, without explanation, selected the federal law of privilege.16
5
This choice probably reflected the fact that the boundaries of FRE 501's state
law proviso do not coincide with the boundaries of diversity jurisdiction. 166
159 S. REP. No. 93-1277 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7059.
160 FED. R. EVID. 501.
161 Haghighi v. Russian-Am. Broad. Co., 945 F. Supp. 1233 (D. Minn. 1996), rev'd
on other grounds, 173 F.3d 1086 (8th Cir. 1999).
162 Haghighi, 173 F.3d at 1086.
163 Haghighi, 945 F. Supp. at 1235 (precluding testimony of mediator on motion to
enforce disputed settlement).
164 FDIC v. White, 76 F. Supp. 2d 736, 737-38 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
165 Id. at 737.
166 The same is true for the boundaries imposed by the Rules of Decision Act for
purposes of the Erie analysis. See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And the New
Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 408 n.122 (1964) (describing the





The source of privilege cannot be determined mechanically by looking to the
basis for federal court jurisdiction; instead, the key is the law that supplies
the rule of decision for the claim. 167 If a claim or defense is governed by
federal law, federal law will also govern the applicable privileges, even in a
diversity suit.168 In the interest of national uniformity, federal common law
may govern when the federal government, or its agency, is a party to a
suit.
169
When dealing with a procedural matter, a court's usual approach is to
apply familiar forum law to maximize efficiency in the decisionmaking
process. Congress, however, recognized the important substantive element in
privilege law by using the underlying rule of decision as the determinative
criterion in FRE 501. Because a privilege excludes evidence that may be
highly probative, it reduces the accuracy of decisions that implement the
16 7 The Senate Judiciary Committee proposed, and the Senate approved, 120 CONG.
REC. 36,925 (1974), an amendment that would have determined the applicable law of
privilege based on the source of federal court jurisdiction. The goal was to reduce
anticipated litigation with "a clearer and more practical guideline." S. REP. No. 93-1277,
at 12 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7059. This approach was rejected by
the Conference Committee. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 93-1597, at 7-8 (1974), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098, 7101.
168 See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1597, at 7-8 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098, 7101 ("[S]tate privilege law will usually apply in diversity cases.
There may be diversity cases, however, where a claim or defense is based upon federal
law. In such instances, federal privilege law will apply to evidence relevant to the federal
claim or defense.").
Similarly, in federal question cases, federal courts" also match privilege law with the
substantive rule of decision, not the source of jurisdiction. They therefore use state-law
privileges for cases decided on state-law grounds even if the case is in federal court
pursuant to a federal statute. To cite one example, in adversary proceedings brought in
bankruptcy cases, federal courts frequently use state-law privileges even though
jurisdiction is conferred by the federal Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., Hudgins v. Sec. Bank
of Whitesboro, 188 B.R. 938, 942-44 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1995) (using state law in
bankruptcy adversary proceeding to determine if agreement was reached in prior
mediation); see also In re Geothermal Res. Int'l Inc., 93 F.3d 648, 653 n.4 (9th Cir.
1996) (applying state law attorney-client privilege to state claim of breach of fiduciary
duty adjudicated in bankruptcy); In re Megan-Racine Assoc., Inc., 189 B.R. 562, 569
(Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995) (applying state privilege law in adversary proceeding dealing
with state law issues); In re Tidewater Group, Inc., 65 B.R. 179, 181-82 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 1986) (applying state privilege law in adversary proceeding grounded in state-law
claims for breach of contract and fraud; distinguishing applicable privilege law when
proceeding involves questions of bankruptcy law).
169 See, e.g., FDIC v. Oldenburg, 34 F.3d 1529, 1538 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting suits
brought by the FDIC are governed by federal law). But see O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC,
512 U.S. 79, 85-86 (1994) (holding federal interest not at stake when FDIC not asserting
its rights but the rights of member bank).
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substantive law at issue. Enacting or creating a privilege thus represents a
policy choice to elevate the confidentiality of certain communications over
the importance of the norms expressed in the jurisdiction's substantive
rule. 170 This recognition of a substantive purpose for privileges was at the
direct behest of Congress, which rejected the version of the privilege rules
proposed by the Supreme Court and made changes designed to avoid
overriding state substantive rules. 171
While this incorporation of the substantive role of privilege into the
federal choice-of-law rule was a step forward, FRE 501's dispositive
emphasis on the source of the rule of decision means that it recognizes only a
single policy interest: the extent to which excluding certain evidence will
affect the enforcement of the norms expressed in the underlying substantive
law. 172 When the underlying law is federal, FRE 501 directs federal courts to
the balance of competing values embodied in the federal privilege. When it is
state, FRE 501 directs federal courts to the balance expressed in the state's
privilege. Therefore the jurisdiction that provides the norms expressed in the
underlying substantive law also determines the competing values that will be
recognized in the form of privileges. This one-dimensional formulation in
FRE 501 can be both under- and over-inclusive. It ignores the potentially
conflicting values that may be important to other jurisdictions involved in the
settlement process-as the host for the mediation, the forum for the initial
suit, or the forum for the confidentiality dispute-in seeing their
confidentiality law applied. 173 It emphasizes underlying law that is no longer
relevant if the case has settled and the parties have agreed on private
norms. 174 Moreover, even with its one-dimensional criterion, FRE 501 does
little to promote predictability. Courts have often reached contradictory
conclusions in categorizing rules of decision as federal or state, thus
perpetuating uncertainty in the rule's most fundamental distinction. 175
17 0 See Dudley, supra note 25, at 1801-03, 1807-10.
171 See, e.g., Olin Guy Wellborn Im, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the
Application of State Law in the Federal Courts, 55 TEX. L. REV. 371, 401 (1977);
Margaret A. Berger, Privileges, Presumptions and Competency of Witnesses in Federal
Court: A Federal Choice-of-Laws Rule, 42 BROOK. L. REV. 417, 439 (1976).
172 See Dudley, supra note 25, at 1803.
173 See discussion supra Part II.
174 See supra text accompanying note 32.
175 One particularly thorny area involves claims against the government under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Because the Act designates the use of state tort law to
determine liability, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (Supp. V 1999), many courts reason that state
law provides the rule of decision and the privilege, in spite of the jurisdiction conferred
by federal statute. See, e.g., Ellis v. United States, 922 F. Supp. 539, 540 (D. Utah 1996);
Huzjak v. United States, 118 F.R.D. 61, 63 (N.D. Ohio 1987). In other forums, courts
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The analysis is even less satisfying when state-law claims are joined with
a federal question and brought in federal court under supplemental
jurisdiction. In Folb v. Motion Picture Industry Pension & Health Plans,176 a
federal question based on the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA)177 was removed to federal court along with pendent state
claims.178 The suit was brought by a fired employee who alleged that he had
been illegally discharged in retaliation for whistle blowing. 179 His employer,
the Plans, maintained that plaintiff's termination was justified because he had
sexually harassed another employee. 180 The plaintiff sought discovery
relating to a prior mediation between the Plans and the employee who
claimed the plaintiff had harassed her, arguing that this mediation
information would show that the Plans had maintained there had been no
harassment. 181 FRE 501 is silent as to the appropriate source of privilege for
cases like this with claims based on both federal and state law. Courts have
filled this interstice with a "general rule [that] 'in federal question cases
where pendent state claims are raised the federal common law of privileges
should govern all claims of privilege raised in the litigation." ' 182 Applying
have reasoned that state law is adopted as federal common law under the FTCA, so the
FRE 501 state law proviso does not apply and federal common law should supply any
privilege. See, e.g., Galarza v. United States, 179 F.R.D. 291, 293 (S.D. Cal. 1998);
Young v. United States, 149 F.R.D. 199, 201-04 (S.D. Cal. 1993). See also Syposs v.
United States, 179 F.R.D. 406, 409 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (ignoring rule of decision analysis
and concluding that state privilege was inapplicable in FTCA suit because of federal
question jurisdiction), adhered to on reconsideration, 63 F. Supp. 2d 301 (W.D.N.Y.
1999).
176 Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164
(C.D. Cal. 1998), affd mem., 216 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000).
177 Employee Retirement Income Security Act, Pub. L. No. 93-406 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
178 See Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1167.
179 Id. at 1166.
180 See id. at 1167.
181 Id.
182 Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Ins. Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 35 F. Supp.
2d 582, 589 n.14 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (quoting Hancock v. Dodson, 958 F.2d 1367, 1372
(6th Cir. 1992)). See also Pearson v. Miller, 211 F.3d 57, 65-66 (3d Cir. 2000); Religious
Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 971 F.2d 364, 367 n.10 (9th Cir. 1992); Hancock v. Hobbs,
967 F.2d 462,466-67 (11th Cir. 1992); von Bulow v. von' Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 141 (2d
Cir. 1987); Win. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 671 F.2d 100, 104 (3d Cir.
1982); Mem'l Hosp. v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1061, 1061 n.3 (7th Cir. 1981).
The mere presence of a federal claim, however, does not seem to be enough to bring
a case under this rule. See, e.g., Platypus Wear, Inc., v. K.D. Co., 905 F. Supp. 808, 811
(S.D. Cal. 1995) (applying state privilege to state claims in spite of federal counterclaim);
see also Scott v. McDonald, 70 F.R.D. 568 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (applying state privilege to
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this "general rule," the Folb court ruled that privilege was governed by
federal common law and proceeded to outline a federal mediation privilege
that partially blocked discovery of the mediation.183
The "general rule" is in tension with a literal reading of FRE 501, which
implies that courts will apply the federal common law of privilege to the
federal claims and the state law of privilege to the state claims. But when
federal and state privileges are at odds, a claim-by-claim approach could
require a court to admit evidence for a federal claim while excluding the
same evidence as privileged for a pendent state claim. Many federal courts
regard this result as unworkable and so have adopted the general rule
favoring federal privilege law for practical reasons, concluding that "it would
be meaningless to hold the communication privileged for one set of claims
but not for the other."' 184 Other courts have reached the same result by relying
on a statement in the Senate report on FRE 501 that "[i]t is also intended that
the Federal law of privileges should be applied with respect to pendant State
law claims when they arise in a Federal question case." 185 This reasoning has
been criticized, however, because the comment was made in support of the
Senate's version of FRE501, which was rejected in conference. 186 Yet
diversity negligence claim in spite of allegations that violation of federal statutes
established negligence). Nor does the initial composition of the case control the analysis.
See, e.g., Anas v. Blecker, 141 F.R.D. 530, 531 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (applying state law to
privilege issues after federal securities claims dismissed leaving only pendent state
claims).
183 Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1169-80. See supra text accompanying notes 96-100.
184 Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 458 (N.D. Cal. 1978). See
also 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 501.02[2][c] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2001) ("[P]ermitting evidence
inadmissible for one purpose to be admitted for another purpose defeats the purpose of a
privilege. The moment privileged information is divulged the point of having the
privilege is lost."). The same rationale applies when diversity of citizenship and the
presence of a federal claim provide a dual basis for federal court jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 141; Smith v. Alice Peck Day Mem'l Hosp., 148 F.R.D. 51, 53
(D.N.H. 1993).
One court suggested the alternative of trying the state claim separately in order to
avoid undermining either rule. See Research Inst. for Med. & Chemistry, Inc. v. Wis.
Alumni Research Found., 114 F.R.D. 672, 675 n.2 (W.D. Wis. 1987). I have found no
published cases in which courts have done this.
185 S. REP. No. 93-1277, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7059 n.16. See, e.g.,
von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 141 (2d Cir. 1987); Sabree v. United Bhd. of Carpenters &
Joiners of Am., Local No. 33, 126 F.R.D. 422, 424 (D. Mass. 1989); Pinkard v. Johnson,
118 F.R.D. 517,520 (M.D. Ala. 1987).
186 See, e.g., Hansen v. Allen Mem'l Hosp., 141 F.R.D. 115, 120-21 (S.D. Iowa
1992) (suggesting that the legislative history of FRE 501 cannot resolve the problem of
"conflicting federal and state privilege law in the context of pendent state-law claims");
[Vol. 17:2 2002]
PREDICTABLE MEDIATION CONFIDENTIALITY
another rationale for the "general rule" is that federal policy favors
admissibility of evidence, and state laws are likely to confer more generous
privilege protection. 187 All of these rationales are unsatisfactory, but
FRE501's single criterion precludes considering other factors that could
potentially resolve the conflict.
There are courts that espouse a piecemeal approach under FRE 501. The
Tenth Circuit decided to look to state law in deciding privilege questions for
state causes of action, even when they accompany federal claims, 188 although
it has not faced a case with conflicting privileges and evidence relating to
both claims. Other courts use a claim-by-claim approach selectively. When
the evidence claimed to be privileged in a mixed-claim case is relevant only
to pendent state-law claims, they use the state law of privilege for the state
claims.189 This approach makes sense from the perspective of interest
Perrignon, 77 F.R.D. at 458-59 (stating that "the Senate Judiciary Committee's
statement provides no evidence of congressional intent with respect to FRE 501 as it was
ultimately enacted").
187 See, e.g., FDIC v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank of Chi., 84 F.R.D. 345, 349 (N.D. Ill.
1979). Again, the Senate Report provides the only indication that Congress supported this
rationale:
If the rule proposed here results in two conflicting bodies of privilege law
applying to the same piece of evidence in the same case, it is contemplated that the
rule favoring reception of the evidence should be applied. This policy is based upon
the present rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides: In any
case, the statute or rule which favors the reception of the evidence governs and the
evidence shall be presented according to the most convenient method prescribed in
any of the statutes or rules to which reference is herein made.
S. REP. No. 93-1277.
188 See, e.g., Motley v. Marathon Oil Co., 71 F.3d 1547, 1551 (10th Cir. 1995).
189 See, e.g., Freeman v. Fairman, 917 F. Supp. 586, 588 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (applying
state privilege to evidence that was relevant only to pendent state claim); Evanko v. Elec.
Sys. Assoc., Inc., No. 91 Civ. 2851, 1993 WL 14458, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1993)
(holding that discovery of medical records relevant only to pendent state claim of
emotional distress is governed by state physician-patient privilege); Shaklee Corp. v.
Gunnell, 110 F.R.D. 190, 192 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (applying state law of privilege when
state and federal claims are joined but evidence affects only state claims); see also
Waterloov Gutter Prot. Sys. Co. v. Absolute Gutter Prot., L.L.C., 64 F. Supp. 2d 398,
411-15 (D.N.J. 1999) (applying state privilege to state-law counterclaim in patent
infringement suit).
Unfortunately for the goal of predictability, other courts have explicitly rejected this
selective approach based on relevance. See, e.g., United States v. Keystone Sanitation
Co., 899 F. Supp. 206, 208 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (order on reconsideration) (stating in dicta
that even if accountant privilege were relevant only to the pendent state claim, federal
law of privilege would govern); Doe v. Special Investigations Agency, Inc., 779 F. Supp.
21 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (applying principles of federal privilege in case with federal and state
claims even though evidence sought was relevant only to the pendent state-law claim);
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analysis in that the policies expressed in the substantive law of the federal
forum are not at issue. Unfortunately, the implications of an interest analysis
are truncated at this point, because even a selective approach to FRE 501 is
limited to its framework and cannot take into consideration the federal
interests that can arise in relation to the federal court's role as host for the
mediation or as the forum for the underlying or subsequent disputes.
Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co. 190 illustrates a variant of the claim-by-
claim piecemeal approach to choice of law in the mediation setting. Like
Folb, the case involved a mixture of federal and pendent state claims 191 but,
unlike Folb, the court assessed mediation confidentiality under California
state law rather than within the federal framework. 192 The Olam court was
faced with a motion to enforce a settlement memorandum of understanding
reached through its mediation program. 193 It defined the relevant "claim" as a
state-law cause of action to enforce a settlement agreement, 194 thus
separating this mediation-related claim from the mixed federal and state
composition of the underlying suit. The court then held that the state-law
proviso of FRE 501 applied to this separate claim, so state law provided the
privilege for information about the mediation and the disputed agreement.1 95
Using the state-law privilege in this situation did not lead to inconsistent
treatment of the federal claims because the privileged information was
irrelevant to those particular claims. 196
see also PPM Am., Inc. v. Marriott Corp., 152 F.R.D. 32, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (applying
federal law to privilege claim for evidence relevant to state-law counterclaim when
plaintiffs' claims were predicated on both federal and state-law claims).
190 Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
191 Federal court jurisdiction was premised on claims under the federal Truth in
Lending Act with supplemental jurisdiction over state claims for fraud and breach of
fiduciary duty. Id. at 1115.
192 Id. at 1119.
193 Id. at 1116-18.
194 Id. at 1119.
195 Id. at 1121. The court delineated an exception to the state-law confidentiality
protections, id. at 1131-39, and heard under seal the mediator's testimony on the
objecting party's claim of undue pressure to sign the agreement. Id. at 1145-50.
Ultimately the court unsealed the testimony to support its conclusion that the objection
had no merit and the settlement should be enforced. Id. at 1139, 1151.
196 A claim-by-claim approach to choice of law has also been rejected, in dicta, in
the mediation context. In Smith v. Smith, 154 F.R.D. 661 (N.D. Tex. 1994), the plaintiff
alleged that a settlement to which he had consented in a prior state court mediation was
procured by fraud, and the defendants sought to subpoena the mediator to testify about
the mediation. Federal court jurisdiction was premised on federal securities laws and the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, with supplemental state claims of
fraud. Id. at 664. The court stated that even if an issue of mediator privilege arose only in
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The Folb case illustrates the difficulties that FRE 501's exclusive
reliance on the rule of decision creates for predicting confidentiality
protection. In FoIb, events in a subsequent lawsuit completely unrelated to
the private mediation determined the confidentiality of the mediation-had
the court not concluded that ERISA preempted one state claim and refused to
remand plaintiff's state claims for wrongful termination, the requested
discovery would have taken place in state court subject to California
mediation protections instead of federal common law. This may seem
arbitrary. Because it seeks to further the substantive interests of the
jurisdiction that supplies the rule of decision, FRE 501 provides no
functional way to resolve the conflict between state and federal law when
they both supply substantive rules of decision in a case.
The Olam case demonstrates a way to avoid this conflict by redefining
the relevant claim if the issue is settlement enforcement. The circumstances
of this case also illustrate, however, that expanding the- analysis beyond
consideration of the underlying causes of action may only reveal other
conflicts. The state and federal interests in the underlying claims that form
the basis for the FRE 501 calculus were not relevant, because the parties had
(allegedly) settled them. The state, however, had an interest in its policies
relating to settlement validity that were embodied in state contract and
privilege law. 197 Under the Olam court's application of FRE 501, this was
the interest it relied on to select state privilege law. But if it had expanded its
analysis to include other criteria, the court would have discovered conflicting
federal interests. The federal court served as the host of the mediation, the
forum for the initial dispute, and the forum for the subsequent dispute,
implicating multiple federal interests in the success of the mediation and the
effects of enforcing or invalidating the settlement agreement.
The Olam case also demonstrates the uncertainty associated with
confidentiality in a federal court mediation program. The parties conducted
their mediation in the Northern District of California's program, with a court-
provided mediator, subject to the program's rules. But because the court
viewed the claim for enforcement of the alleged agreement as a matter of
state law, it held that the court rules governing the mediation did not
the context of a state-law claim brought under the court's supplemental jurisdiction, the
federal law of privilege would "supersede[ ] any contrary state law." Id. at 671. After
discussing the pros and cons of a federal mediation privilege, id. at 670-75, the court
resorted to state law, apparently adopting it as federal common law, because the parties
had assumed that Texas law and the state court mediation rules would govern
confidentiality. Id. at 666-70.
197 Arguably, there was no competing federal interest in settlement validity in that
no federal standards have been articulated for settlements of actions under the Truth in
Lending Act at issue in Olam.
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apply. 198 California has a mediation statute and it is not clear how, or if, the
source of confidentiality law affected the outcome in the case. In other cases
with weak state law, however, choice of law could be crucial:
[E]ven when a local rule adopted by a federal district court... offers more
protection to mediation communications than would be offered by the law
of the state where the district court sits, the federal court must apply state
privilege law when state substantive law is the source of the rule of decision
on the claim to which the proffered evidence from the mediation is
relevant. 199
These cases and their varying outcomes indicate that a party must
forecast multiple factors in order to predict whether state or federal privilege
law will apply. Additionally, they reveal that the choice-of-law analysis for
mediation privileges can be mechanical and arbitrary when it does not reflect
all of the relevant considerations at stake in balancing confidentiality and
disclosure for mediation communications. Expanding the relevant
considerations might make the analysis more meaningful, but is not likely to
improve predictability.
2. Restriction on Mediator Testimony
The applicable rule of testimonial capacity in federal courts is also
controlled by a federal rule of evidence-in this case FRE 601.200 The rule
declares that all witnesses are competent to testify in federal court unless
state law provides the rule of decision and makes the witness incompetent.
FRE 601's abbreviated state law proviso recognizes the same substantive
interests as those acknowledged by FRE 501's proviso. The rule can be
interpreted in tandem with FRE 501 to some extent, and it is characterized by
limitations and ambiguities very similar to those that plague FRE 501.201
198 Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1121-25.
199 Id. at 1125.
200 FRE 601 provides,
Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in
these rules. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of
a claim or defense as to which state law supplies the rule of decision, the
competency of a witness shall be determined in accordance with State law.
FED. R. EvID. 601.
201 It also carries a history similar to that of FRE 501. The original Judicial
Conference proposal to eliminate entirely all competency requirements and grounds for




As with the federal privilege proviso, the boundaries of the, state law
incapacity proviso are formed by the source of the rule of decision, not the
source of federal court jurisdiction, with all the interpretive difficulties that
attend that analysis.20 2 Also, like FRE 501, FRE 601 does not specify the
applicable law for mixed.federal and state claims. Read literally, the rule
would permit a witness to testify on some, but not all, related claims. For
example, in a case joining federal antitrust and state unfair competition
claims, if a witness were disqualified under state law, he would.be competent
to testify only on the federal antitrust claim even though his testimony would
be equally relevant to both claims. Unlike FRE 501, however, no general rule
has developed for FRE 601 in the context of pendent claims, probably
because there are so' few federal court cases concerning witness
competency. 203
When a state uses disqualification of the irediator as a witness to protect
mediation confidentiality, the question whether that law will be applied in a
particular case is subject to all the uncertainties explored in the context of
privilege. This uncertainty only increases .with state statutes that make a
mediator immune to service of process rather than declaring her incompetent
to testify. It is then no longer clear that FRE 601 supplies the appropriate
analysis in federal court. It may be that applicable law should instead be
determined using an Erie analysis, as with the evidentiary exclusions
discussed in the next section.
3. Evidentiary Exclusion
When the confidentiality provision at issue is an evidentiary exclusion or
a state version of FRE 408, the Erie doctrihe2 4 and its progeny determine
applicable law. While the original Erie analysis relies on the rule of decision,
rejected because it failed to recognize state interests in the competency of witnesses. See
WRIGHT& GOLD, supra note 110, § 6001, at 4-5.
202 See supra text accompanying notes 166"69.
203 In the mediation context, state statutes that declare mediators incompetent to
testify have been analyzed in federal court under the rubric of privilege. See Haghighi v.
Russian-Am. Broad. Co., 945 F. Supp. 1233, 1235 (D. Minn. 1996), 'rev'd on other
grounds, 173 F.3d 1086 (8th Cir. 1999); Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d
1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999). For a discussion of the various approaches courts could take in
applying FRE 601 to a case with pendent state claims, none of them entirely satisfactory,
see WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 110, § 6009, at 80-93.-
204 In Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), tfie Supreme Court held that
Congress had no power to create substantive rules of common' law to govern in a state.
Therefore, federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply state substantive
law-both decisional and statutory-io adjudicate state-created rights.
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also adopted as the criterion in FRE 501 and FRE 601, Hanna v. Plumer20 5
established a special Erie analysis for federal procedural rules: the federal
rule preempts conflicting state procedures unless a court determines that it is
unconstitutional or beyond the scope of the rulemaking power Congress
delegated to the Supreme Court. 206 The Federal Rules of Evidence share this
special status in the world of Erie and, as a set of procedural rules passed by
Congress, are regarded as presumptively constitutional. This means that
when a court determines choice of law between state and federal
exclusionary rules, the standard, and perhaps consequently the result, differ
from that for a privilege or testimonial incapacity.
The relevant federal exclusionary rule for settlement processes in general
is FRE 408.207 In states that have adopted the rule without change, there is no
vertical conflict in federal court. But FRE 408 is a narrower exclusion than
the state equivalents with strengthened mediation coverage, as in Maine and
Indiana. 20 8 In these states, a federal court using the Hanna analysis would be
expected to find a conflict and apply the federal rule to admit the evidence in
circumstances when the state's restrictions on mediation evidence cannot be
applied simultaneously with the federal rule's limited exclusion of
evidence. 20 9 Similarly, a federal court could find a conflict between FRE 408
205 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
206 380 U.S. 460, 469-73 (1965) (resolving conflict between a state service of
process rule and Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP)). The Court
acknowledged "the long-recognized power of Congress to prescribe housekeeping rules
for federal courts even though some of those rules will inevitably differ from comparable
state rules." Id. at 473.
207 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
208 See supra text accompanying notes 128-29.
209 There is, to be sure, uncertainty in the concept of "conflict" between state and
federal evidentiary principles depending on the sphere of coverage assigned to a rule.
Compare Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750-51 (1980) (interpreting
narrowly FRCP 3's provision that a case starts with filing the complaint and finding no
conflict with a state statute that requires service of process to toll the statute of
limitations), with Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470 (finding conflict between FRCP 4's service
requirements and state requirements for service on the executor of a deceased).
If a court is willing to define its sphere of coverage broadly enough, the Federal
Rules of Evidence could be interpreted to cover all potential evidence in federal court and
thus preempt any state rule of evidence. Wright and Miller suggest that FRE 402's
provision that "[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules
proscribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority" can be read as a
congressional instruction to admit all evidence not excluded by particular authorities.
Because "state statutes and rules" are not listed among those authorities, a court could
conclude that therefore state evidentiary rules, however substantive, should give way in
diversity cases to FRE 402. See 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
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and a state-law evidentiary exclusion that governs mediation.210 A
categorical state evidentiary exclusion for mediation is narrower than
FRE408, in that it governs only mediation. But this exclusion is also
broader, in that evidence is excluded without regard to the purpose for which
it is proffered. A state evidentiary exclusion will thus overlap in coverage
with the federal rule to the extent the mediation is a settlement proceeding
and contradict it, creating a conflict, to the extent the evidence is offered for
a purpose other than proving liability or damages. 211
Thus, for states that have enacted an evidentiary exclusion stronger than
FRE 408, the Hanna analysis seems likely to lead to an application of the
federal rule. This would result in a lack of vertical uniformity and some of
the forum shopping and fairness problems that the traditional Erie analysis
was designed to avoid. For instance, a mediation participant in a state with a
strengthened version of Rule 408 or an evidentiary exclusion for mediation
who wants to introduce mediation communications in court would be well
advised to file the case in (or remove it to) a federal court, which would
apply the more limited protection of FRE 408 as a result of Hanna
preemption.212 The broader consequence for mediation is that, absent a
crystal ball to foresee which court-state or federal-they would be in
should a dispute arise, mediation participants will be uncertain about the
extent to which an evidentiary exclusion will protect their confidentiality.
Some federal courts have, moreover, introduced additional uncertainty
by relying on an examination of substance and procedure, an approach that
AND PROCEDURE § 4512 (2d ed. 1996). Federal courts that have considered the issue
explicitly have rejected the argument that FRE 401 and 402 control admissibility in the
face of a substantive.state exclusionary rule.. See, e.g., Hottle v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 47
F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995); Potts v. Benjamin, 882 F.2d 1320, 1324 (8th Cir. 1989);
Morton v. Brockman, 184 F.R.D. 211, 216 (D. Me. 1999) (evidence of nonuse of
seatbelts "unlikely" to be admissible under Rules 401-402). Recently, however, courts
have tried to separate the substantive and evidentiary aspects of such state rules. See, e.g.,
Fitzgerald v. Expressway Sewerage Constr., Inc., 177 F.3d 71, 74 (1st Cir. 1999)
(deciding that state collateral source rule is a substantive rule of damages but its
evidentiary implications are governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence, especially FRE
401, 402 & 403).
2 10 See supra text accompanying notes 114-15.
211 In adopting a mediation privilege, Folb v. Motion Picture Industry Pension &
Health Plans avoided this conflict by preserving a role for FRE 408 with a temporal
definition of mediation. The court held that FRE 408, rather than a mediation privilege,
applies after the conclusion of the formal mediation session. Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164,
1171 (C.D. Cal. 1998), aff'd mer., 216 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000). See supra text
accompanying notes 96-100.
212 A participant with similar desires who cannot meet the requirements of diversity
jurisdiction would be restricted by the more stringent state confidentiality protections in
state court and would undoubtedly see this as an inequitable administration of the law.
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reverts to Rules Decision Act analysis and thus seems at odds with Hanna
preemption. State-law evidentiary rules were traditionally characterized as
procedural, 213 which would dictate the use of forum law under a Rules
Decision Act approach. But often exclusion or admission of evidence is an
expression of a substantive state policy to encourage beneficial behavior
outside litigation (such as post-accident remedial measures). 214 Such
evidentiary rules create a doctrinal conundrum, because "[c]ertain matters do
not fall neatly into the substantive/procedural dichotomy, but rather fall
within a twilight zone between both classifications." 215 In a diversity case
with a state evidentiary rule in this "twilight zone," many federal courts are
inclined to emphasize the state's substantive policy goals and may not
explicitly analyze conflicts with the federal n'les. A typical approach is to
ask whether or not the admissibility of evidence is "so intertwined with a
state substantive rule that the state rule [should be] followed in order to give
full effect to the state's substantive policy." 216 This analysis has led a number
of federal courts to apply "substantive" state evidentiary law to determine the
admissibility of certain evidence in diversity cases.
217
213 See, e.g., EUGENEF. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OFLAWS § 12.10 (3d ed. 2000).
214 See supra text accompanying notes 114-15. See generally 19 WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 209, § 4512, at 422. The status of the Federal Rules of Evidence as
substantive or procedural was debated during their formulation because the authority to
promulgate rules under the Rules Enabling Act reaches only to procedural provisions.
This concern became moot when Congress adopted the evidence rules directly as federal
legislation. See Dudley, supra note 25, at 1781 n.4.
215 Carota v. Johns Manville Corp., 893 F.2d 448, 450 (1st Cir. 1990). Categorizing
issues as substantive or procedural is so fraught with difficulty that much of the evolution
of the Erie doctrine has been an attempt to find more workable alternatives by
reformulating the analysis in terms of whether or not the rule is outcome-determinative or
asking how it affects the twin aims of Erie. Cf. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518
U.S. 415, 427 (1996) ("Classification of a law as 'substantive' or 'procedural' for Erie
purposes is sometimes a challenging endeavor.").
216 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2405, at 543 (2d ed. 1996) (citation omitted). See also 19 WRIGHT ET AL.
supra note 209, at 422 (some state laws of evidence "in fact serve substantive state
policies and are characterized more properly as rules of substantive law within the
meaning of the Erie doctrine").
217 The Wright, Miller, and Cooper treatise categorizes "the parole evidence rules,"
the Statutes of Frauds, the agency law principle that the authority of an agent cannot be
proved by his own statements, and rules regarding the admissibility of prejudicial
evidence as "substantive" evidentiary rules that are enforced in federal courts. 19
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 209, § 4512, at 422-24 (citations omitted).
Many federal courts also regard state policies on the admissibility of collateral
source payments of medical expenses as "substantive" and have held that they should
apply in diversity cases. See, e.g., Lomax v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 964 F.2d 1343,
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For mediation evidence, a general state law exclusion is a procedural
technique in that it relates to the process of litigation. The goals often voiced
for encouraging it-saving litigation costs or reducing caseloads-can also
be characterized as procedural in a broad sense. In a "twilight zone" analysis,
this reasoning would favor the applicability of FRE 408 in a federal diversity
case rather than a state evidentiary exclusion. However, one can also argue
that a mediation exclusion reflects the state's substantive policy choice to
encourage mediation, and hence settlement, by ensuring confidentiality for
1345 (3d Cir. 1992) (applying Delaware's collateral source rule as substantive state law);
In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, 803 F.2d 304, 307-308 (7th Cir. 1986) (applying
collateral source rule of Arizona, whose substantive law governed the case); Mitchell v.
Hayes, 72 F. Supp. 2d 635, 636-37 (W.D. Va. 1999) (deciding that while the collateral
source doctrine is an evidentiary rule, it is "closely tied to state substantive policy," so the
state rule governs).
As another example, federal courts typically apply state law rules that deny
admissibility of evidence that seatbelts were not in use during *an accident. This rule
reflects a state substantive policy judgment that failure to use seatbelts should not result
in civil liability or a decrease in damages. See, e.g., Gardner v. Chrysler Corp., 89 F.3d
729, 736-37 (10th Cir. 1996); Dillinger v. Caterpillar, Inc., 959 F.2d 430, 437-38 (3d
Cir. 1992); Potts v. Benjamin, 882 F.2d 1320, 1324 (8th Cir. 1989); Morton v. Brockman,
184 F.R.D. 211, 215 (D. Me. 1999). See also Sours v. General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d
1511, 1519-21 (6th Cir. 1983) (applying Ohio seatbelt law without discussion of whether
substantive or procedural).
Some courts have looked to the substance of state evidentiary rules even when a
federal rule is directly on point and thus a conflict is clear. For example, FRE 407
prohibits admission of evidence of post-injury remedial measures for purposes of proving
culpable conduct, yet many state courts have determined that the policy reasons for
excluding this evidence apply only to negligence cases, and hence do not permit this
exclusion in strict products liability cases. See, e.g., Forma Scientific, Inc. v. Biosera,
Inc., 960 P.2d 108, 115-17 (Colo. 1998). The federal courts of appeals are split on
whether to use FRE 407 or these state evidentiary rules in diversity actions. Compare
Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 931-33 (10th Cir.
1984) (holding that state rule controls in the event of a conflict with FRE 407, which is
based primarily on policy considerations that are closely tied to state products liability
law), with Cameron v. Otto Bock Orthopedic Indus., Inc., 43 F.3d 14, 17-18 (1st 1994)
(deciding that FRE 407 addresses procedural matters and so applies in diversity cases),
Kelly v. Crown Equip. Co., 970 F.2d 1273, 1277-78 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that FRE
407 is "arguably procedural" and therefore governs in spite of Pennsylvania law to the
contrary), and Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co. Ltd., 733 F.2d 463, 471-72 (7th Cir. 1984)
(stating that substantive judgment of FRE 407 is "entwined with procedural
considerations"). In 1997, FRE 407 was amended to clarify that it is applicable to strict
liability actions but the Tenth Circuit has not revisited the issue of applicable law since
the amendment. See Forma Scientific, 960 P.2d at 115 n.12 (predicting the Tenth Circuit
would continue to apply state evidentiary law in diversity cases). See generally Dudley,
supra note 25, at 1810 n.148 (exploring state and federal interests and suggesting
amendment of FRE 407 to incorporate deference to conflicting state rules in state law
cases).
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the process. This reasoning recognizes a state's interest in applying the
balance it has chosen between the values of maintaining confidentiality and
disclosing communications when a mediation takes place in the state or
under state auspices. Moreover, the rules for admissibility of mediation
communications can be analogized to state rules governing admissibility of
evidence from compulsory arbitration or from mediation programs in
medical malpractice suits, which are, for the most part, deemed substantive
and applied in federal court.2 1
8
There is some precedent for displacing FRE 408 using this approach to
the Erie analysis. The First Circuit took this path in the context of a state
"jury rule," which makes evidence of an out-of-court settlement with absent
defendants admissible for a jury to consider in determining its damage
award. 219 The court held that damages are a substantive issue and that the
Massachusetts jury rule was in direct conflict with FRE 408.220 While Hanna
would suggest that FRE 408 preempts the jury rule because of this conflict,
the court refused to "contravene" substantive state law in a diversity action
and held the settlement evidence admissible under state law.221 Thus, in any
state that strengthens its version of FRE 408 or enacts an exclusionary rule to
protect mediation confidentiality, this line of Erie analysis creates doubt
about whether a federal court would find preemption and apply the federal
218 See, e.g., Wray v. Gregory, 61 F.3d 1414, 1417 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying state
admissibility rules for findings of medical screening panel); Daigle v. Me. Med. Ctr.,
Inc., 14 F.3d 684, 689 (1st Cir. 1994) (applying state admissibility rules for findings of
medical screening panel); DiAntonio v. Northampton-Accomack Mem'l Hosp., 628 F.2d
287, 289-90 (4th Cir. 1980); see also Seoane v. Ortho Pharm., Inc., 660 F.2d 146, 149
(5th Cir. 1981) (requiring review by state malpractice tribunal prior to proceeding in
federal court); Feinstein v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 643 F.2d 880, 881-83 (1st Cir. 1981)
(requiring review by state malpractice tribunal prior to proceeding in federal court);
Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 603 F.2d 646, 647 (7th Cir. 1979). But see Hum v. Dericks,
162 F.R.D. 628, 635 (D. Haw. 1995) (finding state requirement for submission to
conciliation panel not outcome determinative and therefore procedural); Seck v.
Hamrang, 657 F. Supp. 1074, 1076-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (citing conflict with federal
court's settlement power under FRCP 16 in holding that state rules do not apply).
219 Carota v. Johns Manville Corp., 893 F.2d 448, 451 (1st Cir. 1990). See generally
James B. Dolan Jr., Crediting Payments by Concurring Tortfeasors: The Decline and
Fall of the Jury Rule?, 65 DEF. COUNS. J. 389 (1998) (examining whether the tort rule
crediting defendants for payments by concurring tortfeasors should be administered by
the court or jury).
220 Carota, 893 F.2d at 451.
221 Id. Massachusetts has since abandoned this evidentiary rule. See Morea v. Cosco,
Inc., 664 N.E.2d 822, 824 (Mass. 1996). See also M. Robert Dushman, Admission of
Evidence of Plaintiffs Settlement with a Joint Tortfeasor: Supreme Judicial Court
Finally Abandons the "Jury Rule," 41 BOSTON B.J., Jan./Feb. 1997, at 12.
[Vol. 17:2 20021
PREDICTABLE MEDIATION CONFIDENTIALITY
rule or would classify the state's rule as a substantive policy and decide that
it must prevail even in the face of FRE 408.
In sum, federal courts may well use the Hanna preemption analysis to
decide that categorical state mediation exclusionary rules are preempted by
FRE 408's more circumscribed evidentiary exclusion. In addition, if a state
alternatively strengthens its version of FRE 408 to better protect mediation
confidentiality, it risks the same result. Preemption by FRE 408 will,
however, result in vertical discrepancies in confidentiality protection that will
diminish predictability in mediation confidentiality. Furthermore, the
possibility that a federal court might stress the substantive goals of mediation
confidentiality by using the alternative "twilight zone" analysis only casts
additional doubt on predicting the governing law.
4. Mediated Settlement Agreements
When attempts to enforce, interpret or declare a settlement agreement
invalid implicate mediation communications, the law that governs settlement
agreements may also establish the level of protection for confidentiality.
When the issue is whether or not the parties reached an oral settlement, for
example, applicable law that recognizes oral mediated agreements provides
an invitation to probe the mediation process to determine whether the parties
reached an agreement. In contrast, jurisdictions that require mediated
settlement agreements to be written and signed as a prerequisite to court
enforcement offer greater protection for confidentiality. Choice of law can be
crucial here, because courts frequently permit oral agreements under the
federal common law of settlement, but policy varies greatly under state
law.22
2
The law that governs the settlement agreement can also set the degree of
mediation confidentiality indirectly by determining the applicable law of
privilege. For example, when the federal court in Olam v. Congress
Mortgage Co. faced a motion to enforce an agreement reached in mediation,
it characterized that motion, rather than the underlying substantive dispute, as
the relevant claim for purposes of its privilege analysis. 223 The court asserted
that settlements are contracts governed by state law and proceeded to analyze
what law of privilege applies in federal court when state law provides the
rules of decision for enforcing a settlement agreement. 224 However, the
preliminary question-whether state or federal law governs a settlement
222 See supra Part II.B.5. See generally Deason, supra note 141.
223 Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1119, 1124 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
224 Id at 1119-25.
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agreement-is a far more complicated issue than the analysis in Olam
suggests. Once again, the result is uncertainty.
In diversity cases, federal courts typically apply state law to govern the
enforcement and interpretation of settlements, although they often do so
without analysis.225 This result advances the policy choices the state made
through its contract law for settlements and is consistent with an Erie
analysis that treats contract enforcement as a substantive matter for state law.
This choice of law ignores, however, the substantive federal interests in
settlement policy that are relevant when a federal court serves as the forum
for the dispute and, perhaps also (as in Olam), as the host for the mediation.
Moreover, even in this setting the distinction between substance and
procedure is not always clear enough to avoid uncertainty. When the
settlement provision takes the form of a state court rule requiring a written
agreement, for example, courts may conclude that this requirement is
procedural and thus does not apply in federal court.
226
When the underlying settled claim instead arises under federal law, the
federal courts' choice of settlement law is fraught with discrepancies.
Rulings on the law applicable to settlements of federal question cases are
contradictory, not only among the federal circuits, but also within circuits.
227
Some courts describe settlement as a contractual matter and tend to apply
state contract law to the settlement agreement. 228 Those that instead
225 See, e.g., Lefevre v. Keaty, 191 F.3d 596, 598 (5th Cir. 1999) (determining
enforcement of settlement in diversity case under state law); Barry v. Barry, 172 F.3d
1011, 1013 (8th Cir. 1999) (construing settlement contract in diversity case according to
state law).
226 See, e.g., Rheault v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 899 F. Supp. 325, 328 (E.D.
Mich. 1995) (refusing to apply Michigan court rule that sets requirements for binding
settlement agreements because rule is procedural, not substantive). The distinction
between substance and procedure is also troublesome in the reverse setting with a state
forum and settlement of a federal claim. See, e.g., Royal Caribbean Corp. v. Modesto,
614 So. 2d 517, 519 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (applying state procedural and evidentiary
law to settlement of Jones Act case governed by federal law).
227 See, e.g., Heuser v. Kephart, 215 F.3d 1186, 1190 n.4 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting
general divergence of views on application of state or federal law to enforcement and
interpretation of settlement agreements); Fleming v. United States Postal Serv., 27 F.3d
259, 260 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing contradictory Seventh Circuit cases applying federal and
state law to settlement disputes in federal cases).
228 See, e.g., Hayes v. Nat'l Serv. Indus., 196 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th Cir. 1999)
(adhering to general reliance on state law to determine enforcement of settlement
agreement in employment discrimination case); Augustine Med., Inc. v. Progressive
Dynamics, Inc., 194 F.3d 1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (interpreting release contained in
settlement agreement according to state law); Jeff D. v. Andrus, 899 F.2d 753, 759-60
(9th Cir. 1990) (holding that construction and enforcement of settlement agreements are
governed by local law on interpretation of contracts); Eastern Energy, Inc. v. Unico Oil &
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emphasize the importance of the federal statutory right tend to lean toward
federal common law.22 9 Their analysis reflects the concern that courts "need
to inquire beyond the state law requirements for a valid contract to fulfill the
remedial policy of [the federal law] and prevent the involuntary or
uninformed compromise of federal rights. '230 In those courts that select
federal common law to govern settlement agreements, further variation is
then generated by the choice between fashioning a uniform national federal
common law and looking to state law for the content of federal common
law.23
1
It is extremely hard to generalize or extract any principles from courts'
decisions, perhaps because settlement appears to be a context prone to "true"
conflicts, that is, those that cannot be avoided by deciding that only one
Gas, Inc., 861 F.2d 1379, 1380 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating "construction and enforcement of
settlement agreements is governed by principles of state law applicable to contracts
generally" and applying state law to settlement of RICO claim (quoting Lee v. Hunt, 631
F.2d 1171, 1173-74 (5th Cir. 1980))).
229 See, e.g., Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 361 (1952)
(holding releases of rights under the Federal Employers' Liability Act are governed by
federal law); Malave v. Carney Hosp., 170 F.3d 217, 220 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that
motion to enforce settlement agreement is determined by federal law, at least when the
underlying cause of action is federal); Williams v. Metzler, 132 F.3d 937, 946 (3d Cir.
1997) (holding that federal common law principles govern construction of settlement
agreement involving a right to sue derived from a federal statute); Snider v. Circle K
Corp. 923 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that enforcement and interpretation
of Title VII settlement agreements are governed by federal common law because these
settlements are "inextricably linked" to the underlying law); Gamewell Mfg., Inc. v.
HVAC Supply, Inc., 715 F.2d 112, 115-16 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that federal law
governs effect of settlement agreement in a case pending in federal court). But see Auer
v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 830 F.2d 535, 538 (4th Cir.- 1987) (holding that state law
governs effect of settlement agreements implicating third parties whose rights and duties
derive from state law).
230 Riley v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 368, 374 (7th Cir. 1989).
231 Compare United States ex rel Green v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 961 (9th
Cir. 1995) (finding that formulation of a uniform federal common law rule to determine
the validity of a release of a statutorily-conferred federal right was justified in qui tam
case), and Locafrance U.S. Corp. v. Intermodal Sys. Leasing, Inc., 558 F.2d 1113, 1115
(2d Cir. 1977) (creating a federal rule to govern the effect of a release by a joint tortfeasor
or coconspirator in a securities case), with Thede v. Norfolk S. Corp., 953 F.2d 1392
(table decision), No. 91-1079, 1992 WL 14943 (10th Cir. 1992) (looking to state law for
guidance on federal common law when no established federal standards exist), Lumpkin
v. Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 933 F.2d 449, 457-58 (7th Cir. 1991) (looking to state law as
source of federal common law on releases when no general federal common law existed),
and Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1458-60 (9th Cir. 1986)
(finding that state law should provide the content of federal common law on the validity
of releases of claims for cost-recovery under CERCLA).
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jurisdiction has an interest is seeing its law applied. The state has relevant
policies for the general process by which parties reach an agreement in its
contract law, but federal policies for surrendering the substantive federal
claim may be equally germane. In addition, when a settlement has been
reached through mediation, the policy choice embodied in the law applicable
to a subsequent dispute may affect the mediation host or the initial forum, as
well as the forum for the subsequent dispute. If so, these jurisdictions also
have interests in having their laws applied.
With so many legitimate sources for settlement law to govern
mediations, it is not surprising that courts disagree on the appropriate choice.
Unfortunately, the lack of a coherent theory for this choice-of-law decision
means that seemingly arbitrary differences between cases can lead to
contrary outcomes. For example, Ninth Circuit courts cite two separate lines
of cases without cross-reference, seeming to draw a distinction between the
construction and enforcement of agreements to settle federal claims-to
which they apply state law-and the validity of releases of federal causes of
action-to which they apply federal law.232
The analysis is, if possible, even less cogent when federal courts must
consider settlements of pendent state claims along with federal claims. Then
the case is often treated as if it were a pure diversity case, with no discussion
of the presence of the federal claim.233 When they do acknowledge a federal
claim, some courts assert that all the settled claims should be treated
consistently, while others approach settlements on a claim-by-claim basis,
232 Compare United Commercial Ins. Serv., Inc. v. Paymaster Corp., 962 F.2d 853,
856 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating construction and enforcement of settlement agreements are
governed by principles of local law applicable to interpretation of contracts generally,
even when federal statute is at issue), and Andrus, 899 F.2d at 759-60 (holding
construction and enforcement of settlement agreements governed by local law on
interpretation of contracts), with Northrop, 59 F.3d at 961 (applying federal common law
to determine the validity of a release of a statutorily-conferred federal right in qui tam
case), Petro-Ventures, Inc. v. Takessian, 967 F.2d 1337, 1340 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding
that federal law governed releases of federal securities law action), and Mardan Corp.,
804 F.2d at 1457 (holding that "federal law always governs the validity of releases of
federal causes of action").
233 See, e.g., Carr v. Runyan, 89 F.3d 327, 331 (7th Cir. 1996) (enforcing mediation
agreement of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and diversity claims under state law without discussion of
federal claim); Valley Ranch Dev. Co. v. FDIC, 960 F.2d 550, 553 (5th Cir. 1992)
(applying state law to enforce settlement agreement as if the case were based on diversity
jurisdiction); Ford v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 928 F.2d 1118, 1120 (11th Cir. 1991)
(holding state law governs construction of settlement agreement in case alleging




contemplating that different rules may govern the settlements of federal and
state claims contained in the same case.
234
The confusion in determining the law applicable to settlement
agreements becomes more important as states modify their traditional
contract rules on oral agreements, either for settlements in general or
mediations in particular. When they create special, more protective, rules for
mediated settlements, they recognize values in confidentiality that were not
previously factored into the policy balance. This then heightens the
importance of which law, federal or state (and if state, which one), will be
used to evaluate the enforceability of the settlement agreement.
5. Interstate Issues
A federal court's vertical choice of law is not the end of the matter for
the parties if the court chooses the state law of mediation confidentiality.
While not the focus of this Article, it is worth mentioning a few of the
sources of unpredictability here. First, it is unresolved whether state or
federal law principles will determine the choice of state privilege law in
federal court.235 Second, the standard for making that choice is not clear
under either state or federal law.236 Third, there is much uncertainty in the
application of many of those standards. If privileges were treated as
procedural, they could be associated predictably with the state forum, but the
trend is to treat privileges as substantive. 237 And although the Restatement
(Second) of Conflicts has been criticized as "forum-centered,"2 38 it does
open the window to non-forum privilege law. It can also be criticized as
234 Compare Sadighi v. Daghighfekr, 66 F. Supp. 2d 752, 759 & n.2 (D.S.C. 1999)
(applying state contract law to enforcement of settlement agreement when state-law
claims more numerous; adopting state law as federal common law to apply to settlement
of federal Title VII and RICO claims because federal interests not impaired) and Tiernan
v. Devoe, 923 F.2d 1024, 1032-33 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing need for consistent rule for
settlement of both federal and state claims and opting for state law because no substantial
federal interest would be affected), with U.S. Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Indus., Inc., 7
F.3d 986, 993 & n.11 (11th Cir. 1993) (certifying questions about settlement of state-law
claims to state court; stating in dicta that releases of federal antitrust claims are governed
by federal common law), and Locafrance U.S. Corp., 558 F.2d at 1115-16 (holding
federal law governs releases of federal statutory claims; contemplating use of state law on
releases for pendent state claims if federal claim survives).
235 See generally MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 84, § 176.
23 6 Id. § 176, at 274 ("Law is still in a state of flux, and there are simply not many
decisions on the question [of] which state's privilege law applies.").
237 See WENTRAUB, supra note 28, § 3.2C3, at 77.
238 See id. at 77-78; Rosenberg, supra note 58, at 168-71.
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favoring admissibility in lieu of privilege, although again, its exceptions
provide flexibility.
239
Federal courts that choose state law when confidentiality issues come up
in the context of settlement enforcement similarly face the unsettled question
of which state law that should be-the law of the forum state, or the law
indicated by the choice-of-law rules of the forum state.240 States that have
adopted the approach of the Restatement (Second) will honor the parties'
choice of law or use the law of the state with the most significant
relationship, another determination that can often cause uncertainty. 241
D. Summary
When the multiple possibilities for choice-of-law doctrine are combined
with the inherent difficulties in applying those doctrines, vertical choice of
law for mediation confidentiality begins to look exceedingly complex. It is
also apparent that in many circumstances this complexity extends beyond
doctrine to the interests at stake in revealing or protecting mediation
communications. Is predictability for mediation confidentiality possible in
this system? The most promising approach for improving predictability is to
make choice of law as irrelevant as possible. This can be done by developing
more fully mechanisms used in other areas where behavior is shaped by legal
expectations. These mechanisms include reliance on party agreements and
uniformity in the law.
239 The Restatement endorses admissibility when the forum recognizes a privilege
even though the state with the most significant relationship to the communication would
admit the evidence, although it permits an exception when admission of the evidence
"would be contrary to the strong public policy of the forum." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139(1) (1971). It also endorses admissibility when the states'
positions on confidentiality are reversed, choosing to apply forum law that permits
admissibility rather than the privilege of the state with the most significant relationship,
unless there is a "special reason" not to use forum law. Id. § 139(2).
240 Compare Tucker v. Tucker, No. 99-35322, 1999 WL 1044911, at *1 (9th Cir.
Nov. 15, 1999) (interpreting settlement agreement in diversity case using contract law of
state in which federal court sits), with Larken v. Wray, 189 F.3d 729, 732-33 (8th Cir.
1999) (construing parties' settlement agreement in diversity case under state law
determined by choice-of-law rules of forum state).
241 See, e.g., Asten, Inc. v. Wangner Sys. Corp., No. C.A. 15617, 1999 WL 803965,
at *2 (Del. Ch. Sept. 23, 1999) (deciding that although the parties chose Delaware as their
place of incorporation and Florida to mediate their federal patent dispute, South Carolina
had the most significant relationship to the transaction as the site of the principal places




IV. POTENTIAL PATHS TOWARD MoRE PREDICTABILITY
There are several ways in which confidentiality could be made more
predictable for parties as they begin a mediation. Some entail the informal
adoption of "best practices" by mediators and attorneys. Section A considers
how mediators and mediation programs could alter the landscape by
encouraging party agreements on mediation confidentiality or choice of law.
Other means involve adopting legal rules that are more consistent among the
courts and jurisdictions. Section B examines the extent to which federal
courts could make mediation confidentiality more consistent by improving
local rules for their mediation programs. Section C maintains that state law is
a crucial element -in the equation and that states could greatly improve
predictability throughout the whole U.S. court system by adopting the
Uniform Mediation Act. In the absence of uniformity, choice of law is an
unavoidable problem, and section D considers how revising FRE 501 could
improve predictability for the selection of privileges in federal courts.
Finally, section E advocates legislating a federal mediation privilege.
A. Party Control with Confidentiality Agreements
Parties to a mediation, either private or court-sponsored, may decide to
bypass the uncertainty of the choice-of-law rules or the weaknesses of the
likely law of confidentiality. Although commentators have questioned the
efficacy of using party agreements to protect confidentiality, 242 there is an
important role for such agreements, and they are used frequently. In private
mediations, parties commonly lay out the ground rules with an agreement to
mediate, which ordinarily also includes an obligation to maintain the
confidentiality of the process. An agreement on operating procedures may be
beneficial even when a state statute protects confidentiality, for it can govern
disclosures outside legal proceedings that may not be covered in the statute.
Ideally, entering such an agreement can influence the parties' behavior by
reinforcing the importance of confidentiality and obtaining the parties
personal commitment to this principle. Such agreements to mediate are less
common with court-sponsored mediation, however, perhaps because court
rules and procedures usually make agreement on ground rules unnecessary.
One use of a confidentiality agreement is to relax the prohibitions of a
statute and allow the parties to make agreed disclosures. Within the rubric of
242 See, e.g., Kirtley, supra note 10, at 11 ("Contract theory offers little to those
interested in broadly protecting mediation communications."); Brown, supra note 11, at
318 ("Agreements purporting to limit access to information disclosed in a mediation are
of dubious effect at best.").
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a privilege, this form of agreement is easily accommodated as a waiver. 243
Such agreements may be particularly helpful with a statute that prohibits
extra-judicial disclosures to anyone other than mediation participants. The
parties may agree instead on the need to consult with non-participants, such
as a corporate board or the members of an organization that would be bound
by the settlement, for approval of any agreement. Mediation with a public
body subject to sunshine rules may also necessitate agreed deviations from a
statutorily-mandated level of confidentiality, or the parties themselves may
decide that this is a situation where the public interest is best served by
compromising secrecy. 2
44
There are limits, however, on the extent to which parties can ensure
confidentiality by agreement. Strengthening the confidentiality provisions of
the applicable statute or creating protection by agreement in the absence of a
statute is questionable. First, unless a confidentiality agreement has been
incorporated into a court order, it is not binding on non-parties to the
agreement.245 Parties may not "contract privately for the confidentiality of
documents and foreclose others from obtaining, in the course of litigation,
materials that are relevant to their efforts to vindicate a legal position. ''246
Second, if the agreement is viewed as an attempt to keep evidence from a
public tribunal it may be void as against public policy.247 The appropriate
243 Although many statutes proclaim broadly that mediation is "confidential," this
may be thought of as a default rule that can be altered by an agreement of the parties.
Many states implicitly acknowledge the possibility of altering strict confidentiality by
agreement by including waiver provisions in their privilege statutes. Oregon is unusual in
that its confidentiality provisions are explicitly designed as default rules. Subject to
certain exceptions, mediation communications are declared confidential and may not be
disclosed to "any other person." OR. REV. STAT. § 36.220(1)(a) (1999). But "[t]he parties
to a mediation may agree in writing that all or part of the mediation communications are
not confidential." Id. § 36.220(1)(b). The statute sets the opposite default rule for
mediated agreements. Absent action by the parties the agreement may be disclosed, id.
§ 36.220(2)(a), but they may agree to keep all or part of its terms confidential, id.
§ 36.220(2)(b).
244 See COLE ET AL., supra note 5, § 9:29. For differing views on mediation
confidentiality for public policy disputes, see Will Pryor & Robert M. O'Boyle, Public
Policy ADR: Confidentiality in Conflict?, 46 SMU L. REV. 2207 (1993) and Thomas S.
Leatherbury & Mark A. Cover, Keeping Public Mediation Public: Exploring the Conflict
Between Confidential Mediation and Open Government, 46 SMU L. REV. 2221 (1993).
245 See COLE ET AL., supra note 5, § 9:24.
246 Grumman Aerospace Corp. v. Titanium Metals Corp. of America, 91 F.R.D. 84,
87-88 (1981) (ordering party to confidentiality agreement to comply with discovery
request filed by nonparty to the agreement).
247 See COLE ET AL., supra note 5, § 9:24; MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 184
(presumption of admissibility of relevant evidence); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,




analysis here is a balancing act: the agreement will not be enforced if the
harm it causes to public policy objectives exceeds the benefit of
enforcement. 248 Accordingly, if mediation communications are at issue in a
suit involving parties who did not participate in the mediation and so did not
agree to confidentiality, a court will likely find that the agreement
undermines the public need for discovery and access to full evidence, and
thus would declare the confidentiality provision void.24 9 Mediation parties
may be able to increase the reach of their confidentiality agreement to third
parties by incorporating it into a protective order entered by the court. 250
While this may improve their ability to resist disclosure in a later suit, it will
not, however, guarantee predictability. Another court with a suit involving a
stranger to the mediation may find that the need for the information
outweighs the need to maintain confidentiality and may lift the protective
order.251 Against a third party, mediation participants need protection
conferred by statute, common-law rule, or local court rule.
Courts seem far more willing, however, to enforce a confidentiality
agreement between the parties to an agreement than against an outsider.252
prohibited). See also Brazil, supra note 127, at 1026-27 (noting possibility that a court
would refuse to enforce a confidentiality contract if it prevented the court from
determining whether a settlement agreement should be enforced or whether the parties
engaged in illegal conduct).
248 See Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) ("[A] promise is
unenforceable if the interest in its enforcement is outweighed in the circumstances by a
public policy harmed by enforcement of the agreement."). Rumery stated that this
standard as a matter of federal common law is applicable to a decision to waive a
constitutional right, but the court relied on principles of traditional contract law
determined with reference to the Restatement of Contracts. Id. at 392 n.2. These
principles are widely applicable and are incorporated in state law, see, e.g., Livingstone
v. North Belle Vernon Borough, 12 F.3d 1205, 1210 n.6 (3d Cir. 1993), and hence should
govern agreements to mediate.
249 See, e.g., EEOC v. Astra USA, 94 F.3d 738, 745 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that
provisions in settlement agreements with employer that prevented employee from
communicating with or assisting EEOC with litigation were unenforceable as against
public policy); Hamad v. Graphic Arts Center, Inc., 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1759, 1760 (D. Or. 1997) (declaring confidentiality provision in settlement that
prohibited settling employee from testifying at deposition void as against the public
policy of encouraging broad discovery and prosecution of employment discrimination
cases).
250 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
251 See, e.g., COLE E'T AL., supra note 5, § 9:21; Richard L. Marcus, Myth and
Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 CORNELLL. REV. 1, 18 (1983).
252 See, e.g., Tarrant Distrib. Inc. v. Heublein Inc., 127 F.3d 375, 379 (5th Cir.
1997) (enforcing confidentiality provision to prevent disclosure of materials submitted to
a third party pursuant to a mediated agreement); Paranzino v. Barnett Bank of S. Fla., 690
305
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Assuming the parties are competent, represented by counsel, and not
hampered by significant differences in bargaining power,253 enforcing a
mediation confidentiality agreement is supported by the public policy in
favor of voluntary settlement of claims,254 and there is no counterweight
from harm to a third party's litigation efforts. There may be other policies
that weigh against maintaining confidentiality pursuant to a party agreement,
but courts have not always found them controlling. 255 For example,
following a mediation concerning allegations that a priest had fondled a
minor, a Florida court required the child's parents to adhere to the
confidentiality agreement they had signed before the mediation.2 56 The
agreement was enforced even though a dissenting judge argued that the
confidentiality clause was void as against public policy given Florida's
requirements to report suspected child abuse.2
51
When parties to a mediation agree they will not subpoena the mediator in
any subsequent litigation, the arguments for enforcing this agreement are
particularly strong. Their agreement is aligned with a public purpose. As
described earlier, precluding mediator testimony is important to maintaining
public confidence in the process.258 The argument in favor of permitting the
mediator to testify may also, however, have merit. The mediator's testimony
may be the most reliable source of information available and its loss will
often reduce the accuracy of the decisionmaking process. In this clash
between encouraging effective settlement by mediation and favoring full
evidence for court decisions, when the parties have a contract protecting the
mediator from demands that he testify, courts have thus far required them to
So. 2d 725, 729-30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (sanctioning party for publicizing
mediation communications when parties had entered agreement to maintain
confidentiality and the mediation was governed by a state statute creating a mediation
privilege).
253 See Brazil, supra note 127, at 1027.
254 See, e.g., Dorn v. Astra USA, 975 F. Supp. 388, 392-93 (D. Mass. 1997) (citing
public policy in favor of private dispute settlement in upholding validity between settling
parties of agreements with confidentiality provisions).
255 See, e.g., Pierce v. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist., 981 P.2d 600, 604-07 (Colo.
1999) (holding that public policy expressed in Open Records Act did not prevent
enforcement of confidentiality provisions of settlement agreement between school district
and superintendent regarding unadjudicated allegations of sexual harassment).
256 C.R. v. E., 573 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (upholding injunction
against breach of mediation confidentiality agreement).
257 Id. at 1089. But see Mary R. v. B. & R. Corp., 196 Cal. Rptr. 871, 876 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983) (refusing to enforce settlement agreement that prohibited alleged victim
of child molestation from revealing information to state authorities).




adhere to this contract.259 Conversely, courts have refused to enforce
agreements between parties for disclosures by the mediator, at least when a
statute or court rule prohibits this testimony.
260
One possible drawback of relying. on an. ageement to provide
confidentiality is that damages for breach may be difficult to measure, and
therefore, the agreement may not provide sufficient deterrence to prevent
disclosures. 261 This objection, however, is only partially applicable. A
confidentiality agreement may not be enough to stop some parties from sua
sponte filing offending material with a court,262 but such agreements are
more likely to play a significant role when a court has the, chance to consider
the disclosure in advance, as with a motion to quash a mediator subpoena.
More widespread use of party confidentiality igreements would be one
way to strengthen the predictability of mediation confidentiality, at least for
disputes between the parties to a mediation. Many mediators and mediation
programs already encourage these agreements. Confidentiality agreements
could also enhance predictability for court-sponsored mediations; however,
only a few courts have incorporated them into their programs. In the Sixth
Circuit, mediators elicit a confidentiality agreement from the parties at the
beginning of the mediation process. Parties are asked to agree that they will
not disclose what anyone says during the mediation or follow-up discussions
"to anyone on this Court or any other court that might ever deal with these
matters." 263 In the Ninth Circuit, the Circuit Mediation Office has prepared a
259 See, e.g., Simrin v. Simrin, 43 Cal. Rptr. 376, 378-79 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965)
(holding, pursuant to confidentiality agreement between the parties, that marriage
counselor could not be compelled to testify about communications made in mediation);
see also Haghighi v. Russian-Am. Broad. Co., 945 F. Supp. 1233, 1235 n.2 (D. Minn.
1996) (noting that in addition to a state-law prohibition on mediator testimony the
parties' agreement to mediate also excluded mediator testimony), rev'd on other grounds,
173 F.3d 1086 (8th Cir. 1999).
260See, e.g., Marchal v. Craig, 681 N.E.2d 1160, 1162-63 (Ind.-Ct. App. 1997)
(reversing decision in child custody dispute because trial court admitted and relied
heavily on mediator's testimony pursuant to parties' stipulation that mediator was an
acceptable witness).
261 See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 58, at 166.
262 Cf. Bernard v. Galen Group, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 778, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(affirming sanctions against an attorney who disclosed to a district court details of a
mediation process in violation of the court's confidentiality provisions governing
mediation).
263 A memorandum originating from the office of the Circuit Mediators at the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit discloses that Sixth Circuit mediators
convey the following statement:
I want to remind everyone that 6th Circuit Rule 33 makes these conversations
confidential and off the record. More particularly, we would like to invite everyone
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confidentiality agreement that the parties may sign as part of initiating
mediation.264 It limits the parties' use of mediation communications in court
proceedings and their disclosures outside court proceedings. 265 Under the
local mediation rule in the Eastern District of New York, parties are asked to
sign a confidentiality agreement providing that mediation communications
to agree that no one connected with these discussions will disclose anything that
anyone says here today-or in any follow up communications that might flow from
these-to anyone on this Court or any other court that might ever deal with these
matters.
So, if there aren't any questions, can we all agree to this-that no one will
disclose anything that anyone says to any court for any purpose?
Letter from Teresa R. Mack, Conference Administrator, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, to Robert J. Niemic (Dec. 5, 2000) (on file with the Ohio State Journal on
Dispute Resolution).
264 In addition, a document from the Circuit Mediation office at the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit entitled "Procedures Governing the Circuit
Mediation Program," states that the parties are assumed to agree to the Circuit's
confidentiality provisions unless they indicate otherwise to the mediator at the initiation
of settlement discussions. U.S. CT. APP. 9TH CIR. P. GOVERNING CIR. MEDIATION
PROGRAM.
265 The agreement reads as follows:
Consistent with the provisions of Ninth Circuit Rule 33-1 governing the
confidentiality of mediation sessions, the participants in the mediation session agree
to the following:
(1) No written or oral communication made by the mediator or any party,
attorney, or other participant in the settlement discussions:
(a) may be used for any purpose in any pending or future proceeding in
this or any other court or administrative forum; and
(b) may be disclosed to anyone who is not a participant in the mediation or
an authorized agent of such participant.
(2) The nondisclosure provisions of paragraph (I) do not apply if such
disclosure:
(a) is agreed upon by the mediator and all participants in the mediation or
(b) is made in the context of any subsequent confidential mediation or
settlement conference with the agreement of all participants and the third party
neutral.
(3) Evidence shall not be inadmissible or protected from disclosure solely by
reason of its introduction or use in settlement discussions.
(4) The parties shall not subpoena the mediator or any documents submitted to
or prepared by the mediator in connection with or during the mediation session and
the mediator shall not testify on behalf of any party.
(5) Nothing in this agreement shall preclude the admissibility of a written
settlement agreement reached as a result of settlement discussions conducted in
whole or in part through the Circuit Mediation Program in an action to enforce such
an agreement.
Confidentiality Agreement, Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Circuit Mediation
Office (on file with the Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution).
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may not be disclosed and that the parties will not call the mediator as a
witness except in a court proceeding concerning the alleged misconduct of
the mediator.
266
While the scope of confidentiality agreements differ, they all serve some
of the same purposes. First, they sensitize the parties to the issue of
confidentiality and stimulate questions and discussion in situations where the
parties anticipate the need for disclosure. Second, they express the parties'
affirmative commitment to maintain confidentiality and may discourage
defections from this principle. Finally, they provide independent authority for
a court to require confidentiality in the event that other legal protections are
unclear or inadequate.
Another way parties can use a confidentiality agreement to increase
predictability is by designating the law that will govern any confidentiality
dispute that arises between them. This is probably already commonplace in
private mediation agreements but could also be useful in court programs. By
choosing the law of a jurisdiction with strong protections against mediation
disclosures, the parties can maximize the chances of maintaining the
confidentiality of their mediation communications, subject only to the normal
choice-of-law rules for designating applicable law.267 Those rules might,
however, prevent parties from designating the law of a jurisdiction that
permits mediator testimony if the mediation would otherwise be governed by
rules that prohibit such testimony.268 I could find no cases exploring the
limits on parties' choice of mediation law, although some federal courts have
266 The local district court rule provides in pertinent part,
(d) Confidentiality.
(1) The parties will be asked to sign an agreement of confidentiality at the
beginning of the first mediation session to the following effect:
(A) Unless the parties otherwise agree, all written and oral communications
made by the parties and the mediator in connection with or during any mediation
session are confidential and may not be disclosed or used for any purpose unrelated
to the mediation.
(B) The mediator shall not be called by any party as a witness in any court
proceeding related to the subject matter of the mediation unless related to the alleged
misconduct of the mediator.
E.D.N.Y. L. Civ. R. 83.11.
267 Under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, parties to an
agreement may designate the law of a particular jurisdiction to govern any issue, if the
issue is one they could have determined directly in their agreement. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(1) (1971). Even if the issue is one they could not
have determined directly in their agreement, the parties' choice will be accepted unless
they selected a jurisdiction with no link to the agreement or the law of that jurisdiction
contravenes a "fundamental policy" of the jurisdiction whose law would apply absent the
parties' designation. Id. § 187(2).
268 See supra text accompanying note 34.
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limited parties' choice of law regarding the validity of releases of federal
causes of action.
269
Parties may also be able to use choice of law in their mediation
agreement to obtain the benefits of a court's mediation rules when they
would not normally apply. For example, the Indiana Rules for Alternative
Dispute Resolution do not govern mediations conducted before a suit is filed;
however, when parties specified in their written mediation agreement that
confidentiality would be maintained in conformity with these rules, an
Indiana court used the rules to decide the parties' confidentiality dispute.
2 70
B. Harmonization of Federal Court Rules
One avenue toward more consistency in confidentiality for federal court
mediation programs is through coordination of the local court rules
governing those programs. Currently, the variability and lack of clarity in
many local rules exacerbate the uncertainty in predicting confidentiality
protection. Revising the wording of many local rules could greatly improve
the protection for mediation communications when those communications
become relevant in later court proceedings.
Because of their history, local district court ADR rules are among the
most variable local federal court rules. In the wake of the Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA), district courts adopted individualized ADR
programs, along with discovery changes and case management innovations,
to attack the problems of cost and delay. 271 Although these innovations were
not the first departure from the ideal of a single, uniform procedural system
that animated the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the CJRA
plans, including local mediation rules, represented a new degree of variation
in federal rules.272 Most of the local ADR rules were not inconsistent with
269 See, e.g., Petro-Ventures, Inc. v. Takessian, 967 F.2d 1337, 1340 (9th Cir.
1992) (holding that federal law governed releases in spite of the parties' agreement that
state law would govern their settlement).
270 Vernon v. Acton, 732 N.E.2d 805, 808 & n.5 (Ind. 2000).
271 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994).
272 On the importance of uniformity in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see
Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015, 1042-98
(1982). Even prior to the CJRA, local rules had introduced inconsistencies with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules,
and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA.
L. REv. 1999, 2000-01 (1989). Scholars disagree on the extent to which the CJRA was
intended to foster local rulemaking at the expense of national consistency. Compare
Lauren Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 1447 (1994), with Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural
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the federal rules, 273 but they certainly differed from each other.274
Congressional tolerance of divergence in federal court ADR rules then
continued with the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998.275 The Act
promotes uniformity, in that it requires district courts to offer an ADR
program and parties to consider using it, but it leaves to each district many
choices on ADR offerings and implementation, including confidentiality.
As one can imagine given this independent development of mediation
programs, the confidentiality rules vary greatly among the federal districts.
2 76
In addition, mediation programs in the courts of appeals, which are
conducted under the authority of Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, were developed circuit by circuit and similarly vary significantly
in their confidentiality provisions.
277
In addition to these variations in content, the ambiguity of many rules
contributes to uncertainty. They frequently do not specify any legal means to
protect confidentiality, and hence, like the state statutes with this flaw, these
rules are not clear on the scope of confidentiality they authorize.2 78 For
example, many rules are concerned with the relationship of the judiciary to
mediation, but while they often prohibit "disclosures to the court," or use
similar language, they frequently remain silent and ambiguous on disclosures
in future cases or to other courts.279 Some rules suffer from the same
shortcoming as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, in that they
merely state that communications shall remain "confidential" without further
Justice, 77 MINN. L. REv. 375 (1992), and Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional
Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and Separation of Powers, 77 MiNN. L. REV.
1284 (1993).
273 But see Robel, supra note 272, at 1454 (describing CJRA Plans that required
mandatory referral to ADR).
274 See generally PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 2 (providing a
comprehensive overview of dispute resolution approaches used in each district and an
analysis of their rules).
275 5 U.S.C. § 574 (Supp. 1998).
2 76 See generally Gregory A. Litt, Note, No Confidence: The Problem of
Confidentiality by Local Rule in the ADR Act of 1998, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1015
(2000) (providing overview of federal courts' treatment of mediation confidentiality).
2 7 7 See generally ROBERT J. NIEMIC, MEDIATION & CONFERENCE PROGRAMS IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS (1997) (providing thorough description of mediation and
conference programs in the federal courts of appeals).
278 See supra text accompanying note 135.
279 See, e.g., N.D. ALA., U.S.D.C.R. app. I, at IV(B)(10); L.R. U.S.D.C. NEB.
53.2(d)(4).
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details on the precise mechanism for maintaining that confidentiality. 280 In
fact, sometimes it is not clear whether a local rule protects mediation
communications only in court actions, only in extra judicial settings, or in
both.281 With these common flaws, simply clarifying their scope would
improve many rules. If, in addition, local rules were made consistent with the
Uniform Mediation Act, this would be an important step in promoting
general uniformity.
282
Unfortunately, there is no institutional mechanism for local rules to
develop consistently. But a bigger drawback to relying on local federal court
rules to achieve consistency is that their control over confidentiality disputes
is itself uncertain. First, the rules that govern federal court programs do not
apply to all mediations or in all forums. They ordinarily do not directly affect
the confidentiality of private mediations or state court-sponsored
mediations.283 The reach of local federal confidentiality rules is also
limited-even for federal court-sponsored mediations-when confidentiality
issues subsequently arise in a state forum. While state courts and agencies
have recognized that they could apply the federal rule as a matter of comity,
to date they have not seemed to regard this as an obligation.284
Second, and most significantly, there are systemic reasons to doubt the
power of federal courts to regulate mediation confidentiality in their
mediation programs through local rules. To be sure, federal courts have
280 See, e.g., Datapoint Corp. v. Picturetel Corp., No. Civ.A.3:93-CV-2381D, 1998
WL 25536 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 1998) (finding no privilege in S.D. Tex. R. 20(1, although
it makes mediations confidential and protects them from disclosure).
281 See NIEMIC Er AL., supra note 7, at 94 (discussing lack of clarity in the term
"confidentiality").
282 Some federal courts currently promote uniformity within their state by
incorporating state mediation rules into their local rules. W.D.N.C. L. R. 16.3(B)(1)
(incorporating by reference mediation rules of North Carolina Supreme Court). See, e.g.,
Doe v. Nebraska, 971 F. Supp. 1305, 1307 (D. Neb. 1997) (describing adoption of state
law to govern mediation program in Nebraska federal courts).
283 Private parties would, however, have the option to adopt court rules by
agreement within the limits of the choice-of-law rules. See, e.g., Vernon v. Acton, 732
N.E.2d 805, 808 & n.5 (Ind. 2000) (discussing adoption of court rules by parties to
private mediation).
284 A recent unreported Massachusetts case provides an example: the court
determined that the First Circuit mediation rules did not preempt state law and applied the
state freedom of information act to compel disclosures about a federal mediation
conducted in an appellate court mediation program. Republican Co. v. Albano, No. 99-
312 (Hampden County Sup. Ct. Apr. 2, 1999). See also Ford Motor Credit v. Shockley,
Reid & Tyson, No. 93-1037-CV-W-6, 1996 WL 9689 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 4, 1996)
(concluding that local federal court mediation rule would not prevent disclosure in state
bar disciplinary proceedings except as a matter of comity).
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applied local rules to prevent, permit, or condemn disclosures of
communications from mediations conducted through federal court
programs.285 Yet when the question before a federal court is whether
mediation communicaiions are privileged, FRE501 does not seem to
contemplate local court rules as a source of law. Under the rule's two-
pronged structure, a federal court must either use the state law of privilege or
the federal common law of privilege unless required otherwise by the
Constitution, an act of Congress, or a Supreme Court rule-a list that does
not include local federal court rules.286 If FRE 501's state-law proviso
applies, local federal court rules are generally irrelevant.287 When FRE 501
points instead to federal law, it specifies that federal common law must be
developed by the courts on a case-by-case basis. This designation of the
common law process would seem to preclude relying on a local rule, without
more, to establish a mediation privilege. In fact, a number of courts have
recently concluded that their local rules do not govern mediation
confidentiality when a privilege would be necessary to control disclosures. 288
In spite of these reasons to doubt that federal court rules will directly
control all confidentiality disputes, clarifying and harmonizing local rules
would be beneficial. Similarity among federal court rules would help solidify
consistent norms and expectations for the mediation process. In practical
terms, this could be one of the most effective ways to prevent confidentiality
disputes from arising at all.
285 See, e.g., Willis v. Trenton Memorial Assoc., 166 F.3d 337, No. 97-1123, 1998
WL 812110 (4th Cir. Sept. 22, 1998) (unpublished table decision) (finding reversible
error in the district court's violation of its own local rule by ordering report from
mediators); Clark v. Stapleton Corp., 957 F.2d 745, 746 (10th Cir. 1992) (admonishing
counsel for disclosing statements made during mediation to the court in violation of 10th
Cir. R. 33.1); Barnett v. Sea Land Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d 741, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1989)
(affirming exclusion of mediation communications pursuant to district court local rule);
Lake Utopia Paper Ltd. v. Connelly Containers, Inc., 608 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1979)
(condemning party's communication of mediator's comments to the court contrary to its
notice of rules); Doe v. Nebraska, 971 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Neb. 1997) (interpreting the
district's mediation plan to permit disclosure of the limits of representative's settlement
authority on motion for sanctions); Bernard v. Galen Group, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 778, 784
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (fining attorney for disclosing settlement offers in violation of court
guidelines for mediation and referral order).
286 See supra note 156.
287 The one exception is when federal court rules incorporate the state law of
confidentiality.
288 See, e.g., FDIC v. White, 76 F. Supp. 2d 736, 737-38 (N.D. Tex. 1999); Olam v.
Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1130 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Folb v. Motion Picture
Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 1998), aff'd mem.,
216 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000).
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Moreover, local rules provide an opportunity for federal courts to
influence the development of the federal common law of mediation
confidentiality. A federal court considering a common law privilege is
instructed to evaluate, among other factors, the need for confidentiality and
the public purpose that would be served by a privilege.289 Local court rules
are indicative of these needs and purposes. 290 Moreover, local court rules are
a logical source for a court adopting confidentiality protection as a matter of
federal common law. By incorporating local rules into federal common law,
courts have given these rules a central role in defining emerging standards
for mediation confidentiality.
291
In sum, approaching the problem through local federal court
confidentiality rules can admittedly yield only a partial solution. Yet in spite
of the limitations on the effectiveness and potential of local rules in the
current privilege framework, if they harmonized their mediation rules federal
courts could provide a model for parties' behavior and for courts that decide
to adopt a federal common-law mediation privilege.
C. State Enactment of the Uniform Mediation Act
Perhaps ironically, the states could make a huge contribution to parties'
ability to predict confidentiality in federal court by adopting a uniform
approach themselves. 292 First, state uniformity is necessary if there is to be
any chance of benefiting from vertical uniformity between state and federal
mediation confidentiality provisions while simultaneously achieving
horizontal uniformity among the federal courts. Thus, the more uniform the
states' treatment of mediation, the more likely their treatment will enhance
overall predictability in the judicial system.
Second, if the states present a united front by adopting the Uniform
Mediation Act, this will influence the adoption of federal common law
privileges in the federal courts. Under the Supreme Court's privilege
analysis, "the existence of a consensus among the States indicates that
289 This evaluation is part of the analysis set forth by the Supreme Court for
considering whether an exception from the general rule disfavoring testimonial privileges
is justified. See Jaffe v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996); Trammel v. United States, 445
U.S. 40, 50 (1980).
290 Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1175.
291 See Sheldone v. Pa. Turnpike Comm'n, 104 F. Supp. 2d 511, 517 (W.D. Pa.
2000) (drawing directly on court's local rules to provide content for federal common-law
mediation privilege).
292 See generally Deason, supra note 11, at 103-04.
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'reason and experience' support recognition of the privilege." 293 Thus, the
states would provide a federal court considering the appropriate federal
common law with powerful evidence of the need for mediation
confidentiality.
Third, when a single state adopts a privilege, as contained in the Uniform
Mediation Act,294 that choice has an immediate and direct effect on
confidentiality in federal court proceedings. A state-law privilege triggers the
application of FRE 501 to determine the applicable law of privilege in
federal court and, for diversity cases (roughly speaking), FRE 501 mandates
state law. The more widespread the adoption of the Uniform Mediation Act,
the less variation parties would see both in the federal courts' confidentiality
analyses and in the law adopted under the state-law proviso of FRE 501.
With extensive adoption of the Uniform Mediation Act, the level of
confidentiality protection would be predictable for state-law cases brought in
either federal or state court. The uncertainty that would remain would affect
federal-law claims and state-law claims coupled with federal claims in
federal court.
Does this mean that Congress, the federal courts, and their rulemaking
committees should sit back and wait for the states to act? Even if the
Uniform Mediation Act would provide a complete solution (which it would
not), such reliance would be risky. The states do not have an especially
exemplary record of adopting uniform laws. NCCUSL achieved its goal of
uniformity with the Uniform Commercial Code, which has enjoyed
widespread adoption and periodic revision, but other uniform acts have met
less success. Many have garnered only token support.
295
The Uniform Mediation Act was considered and approved by NCCUSL
in August 2001. It is scheduled for consideration by the ABA in 2002. The
joint drafting process that involved both NCCUSL and the ABA should
enhance its prospects for wide enactment, but drafts of the Act have proved
controversial with some observer groups. And state legislative processes are,
of course, unpredictable.
D. Revision of the Federal Privilege Rule
Absent uniformity between state and federal laws on mediation
confidentiality, making protection and disclosure more predictable in federal
293 Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 13 (adopting a psychotherapist privilege as a matter of federal
common law).
294 UNIF. MEDIATION ACT §§ 4-6 (2001).
295 See James J. Brudney, Mediation and Some Lessons From the Uniform State
Law Experience, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 795, 810-11 (1998).
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court would require changing FRE 501, the rule that points federal courts to
the applicable law of privilege. Some reforms could be made at the margins,
such as clarifying the appropriate approach for designating the applicable
privilege when a case involves both state and federal rules of decision. This
would, by itself, remove much confusion. 296 Such reforms could improve
predictability in the choice of law in a mechanical way, but they would not
address the underlying difficulties with using FRE 501 in the context of
mediation.2
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Moreover, given the current extreme variability in the state law of
mediation confidentiality, standardizing choice of law through reforms to
FRE 501 at the present time would do little to further predictability one way
or the other in the short term. Matters would improve greatly if the states
embrace the Uniform Mediation Act widely. Then a rule that would lead
federal courts to state law of privilege more often would also improve
parties' ability to predict mediation confidentiality. If the states fail to rally
behind the Uniform Mediation Act, however, a revision that increases federal
courts' reliance on state privilege law would have the opposite effect and
merely contribute to uncertainty in confidentiality.
Realistically, an overhaul of FRE 501 is unlikely unless it is needed in
the broader context of privilege. A more modest goal would concentrate
instead on resolving the inconsistency between the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 1998 and FRE 501. While the Act directs district courts to
adopt local rules providing confidentiality for their ADR programs, strictly
read, FRE 501 currently ignores local court rules.298 This has the practical
effect of undermining many local rules' confidentiality schemes; for unless
there are federal and state privileges at least as strong as the protection
contemplated in a local district court rule, the actual protection for
confidentiality may fall short of the court's promise. From the point of view
of parties caught unaware by inconsistencies between a court rule and the
operative state or federal privilege, courts could be accused of
simultaneously sponsoring mediation and encouraging parties to use it, yet
failing to protect the confidentiality of the process adequately.
One resolution for the discrepancy between the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act and FRE 501 would be to add authority to FRE 501 for
federal district courts to use their local rules to adopt privileges. This power
is arguably justified in the context of mediation because of the congressional
296 See supra text accompanying notes 176-96 (describing the split between
jurisdictions that take a claim-by-claim approach to the applicable privilege and those
that prescribe the federal privilege when a plaintiff joins federal and state claims).
297 See supra Part III.C. 1.
298 See supra note 156 and text accompanying notes 285-88.
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mandate to adopt a confidentiality rule. Moreover, power to create a local
mediation privilege would be directly related to programmatic concerns in
the federal courts: parties in mediation conducted under court auspices need
to know that their confidentiality will be protected effectively.
In the long run an approach centered on FRE 501 would probably prove
ineffective in improving predictability. While a local privilege recognized as
federal law by FRE 501 would give federal districts more control over
confidentiality for their own mediation programs, the process for enacting
local rules is not designed to create consistency among the programs.
2 99
Moreover, authority under FRE 501 to create local privileges could easily
prove unwise if applied beyond the mediation context. Unless local rules
would be a rational part of a broader solution to problems stemming from
FRE 501, which seems unlikely, then this is probably not a fruitful approach.
An amendment to the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act specifying that
local rules govern all confidentiality disputes arising out of federal court
mediation programs would be a more tailored solution. Such an amendment
could also ensure that state courts will apply the rules the parties used to
mediate by preempting state confidentiality rules when the mediation was
conducted in a federal court program.
E. Enactment of a Federal Mediation Privilege
A federal mediation privilege enacted by Congress or delineated by the
Supreme Court would be a more effective way to increase predictability in
federal court then a revision of FRE 501. In fact, the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act contemplates that the local confidentiality rules it requires
will be a temporary measure, in force only until a national rule is adopted
through the Rules Enabling Act process. 300 A single federal privilege
superceding the local rules mandated by the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Act would solve the problems of variability in district court rules. It would
supplement confidentiality agreements by controlling third-party attempts to
obtain disclosures of mediation communications. If enacted or adopted
through the rules process, such a privilege would immediately improve
certainty, as compared to the slow, partial articulation of a privilege through
the common-law process.301 It could be drafted to avoid the discrepancies
that have already begun to develop between state-law privileges and the
29 9 See Litt, supra note 276, at 1032.
300 See 28 U.S.C. § 652(d) (Supp. V 1999).
301 Both Folb and Sheldone defined only some of the necessary elements of a
mediation privilege. See supra text accompanying notes 96-102.
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federal common law due to uncertainties about the relationship of a privilege
to FRE 408.302
Unfortunately, like the other possibilities discussed above, a federal
mediation privilege offers only a partial solution to the need for predictable
confidentiality. Without changes in FRE 501, the privilege would not control
confidentiality when state law provides the rule of decision. Therefore, as
long as some states fail to provide equivalent confidentiality protection,
variation in federal court would remain. Moreover, federal courts would still
lack complete control over their court-sponsored mediation programs
because the federal mediation privilege would not always govern the
confidentiality disputes that arise out of those programs. Nonetheless, a
federal mediation privilege would be a key step toward improving
predictability significantly, especially if it is designed to foster uniformity.
First, a federal mediation privilege (whether enacted or developed
through the common-law process) should be consistent with the state
privilege in the Uniform Mediation Act. Then if the states adopt that Act,
vertical and horizontal uniformity would transcend the problems of
predictability and choice of law. The drawback to this solution, of course, is
that it is not completely within the power of the federal government, because
it depends on the states to enact the Uniform Mediation Act.
Second, Congress should specify that the federal evidentiary privilege for
mediation communications applies as an administrative measure to federal
court mediation programs. Then a single privilege would govern all
confidentiality disputes in cases mediated as part of a federal court program,
and, in addition, under FRE 501 it would govern in disputes with a federal
rule of decision. This strategy would become particularly important if the
states fail to embrace the Uniform Mediation Act and predictability cannot be
achieved through uniformity of state and federal law.
A federal privilege similar to that of the Uniform Mediation Act that also
applies to all cases in federal court-annexed mediation programs would
govern a large proportion of the mediation confidentiality issues in federal
court. Disputes would fall outside this framework only with a private or state
court-annexed mediation and a state-law rule of decision from a state that has
not enacted the Uniform Mediation Act. Such a privilege would go a long
way toward reducing uncertainty in mediation confidentiality even though it
would not cover all situations.




Under current law, it is very difficult to predict with any accuracy the
level of protection for mediation communications in a confidentiality dispute.
Flexibility in forum selection and complexity in choice-of-law rules create
uncertainty in the applicable law. When added to the vast diversity of
confidentiality provisions, this uncertainty means that courts may compel
unexpected disclosures that have the potential to undermine confidence in
mediation.
Federal courts are in the peculiar and awkward position of offering
mediation programs for parties with cases before them when they cannot
necessarily guarantee the continued confidentiality of communications made
during that mediation process. In subsequent proceedings, confidentiality
may depend on state law, which provides comprehensive protection in only
about half the states and is extremely variable even among those states.
Alternatively, confidentiality may depend on federal common law, which is
unarticulated in most jurisdictions.
No single approach will lead to predictability for mediation
confidentiality, but some developments could improve the situation by
maximizing uniformity. In combination, several changes could improve
predictability markedly.
Mediation parties could enhance the predictability of confidentiality for
disputes between them by increasing their use, even in court-sponsored
mediations, of confidentiality agreements to substitute for weak law or to
designate applicable law.
For parties without mediation agreements and for discovery and
testimony beyond the reach of party agreements, uniformity in state law
through enactment of the Uniform Mediation Act would vastly increase
predictability in federal court. The content of state law is important, because
it is often directly applicable in federal court, it determines what choice-of-
law analysis a federal court will use, and it is significant in the recognition of
federal common-law privileges.
Federal rules also need attention. A federal mediation privilege modeled
on the Uniform Mediation Act would enhance both vertical and horizontal
uniformity and thus overall predictability. It would also displace the currently
inconsistent local federal court confidentiality rules. Moreover, Congress
could reduce the uncertainty in confidentiality associated with federal court
mediation programs by making clear that this privilege will govern
subsequent disputes arising out of those mediations in any forum.
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